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INTRODUCTION
It must have seemed like a bizarre good news/bad news joke to the
plaintiff. Imagine the lawyer's explanation:
Well, we served the defendant with a summons at its
place of business in the forum. We sued the defendant in one
of the places in which Congress in the venue statute said a
defendant may be sued. We were even able to persuade the
court that our choice of forum was a reasonable one under
the due process clause of the Constitution since the defendant
could reasonably anticipate being haled into court here. Best
of all, we convinced the court that it should apply the fo-
rum's pro-plaintiff law because the forum state has the most
significant relationship to the controversy. However, I must
tell you that the case was dismissed because the judge didn't
think this was an appropriate forum.
In response to the client's astonished question-"Can't we ap-
peal?"-the lawyer somewhat sheepishly explains that they have al-
ready lost in the Supreme Court of the United States. In Piper Aircraft
Co. v. Reyno," foreign plaintiffs had come to the United States seeking
redress against American manufacturers for injuries suffered in a plane
crash in Scotland. Their claim may or may not have belonged in Penn-
sylvania. But in Reyno, as well as in most forum non conveniens dis-
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454 U.S. 235 (1981). Some literary license has been taken here: in Reyno, it was
the court of appeals and not the trial court that found the forum law to be controlling.
The Supreme Court nevertheless sustained the district court's dismissal. Moreover,
there was no express challenge to jurisdiction in Reyno. Had there been one, there is no
question that jurisdiction would have been sustained; the defendants clearly had suffi-
cient contacts with the forum. See Reyno, 454 U.S. at 239.
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missals, the plaintiffs' claim was dismissed after all formal rules gov-
erning forum access were satisfied: personal jurisdiction, subject-matter
jurisdiction, and venue. It was even determined that the forum's law
would govern the liability issue.2
The courts' response to this curious state of affairs has simply
been to restate the rule that "the doctrine of forum non conveniens can
never apply if there is absence of jurisdiction or mistake of venue."' No
further explanation is offered why a court in its discretion may negate
the effect of formal rules establishing the existence of jurisdiction. This
procedural system that takes away with one hand what it gives with the
other has, for the most part, escaped serious scrutiny.' This Article con-
siders the implications of this redundancy of court-access doctrine in a
reevaluation5 of the evolution and use of the doctrine of forum non
2 The court of appeals determined that the forum law would apply at least to the
conduct of one defendant. Apparently, it felt that Ohio law would govern the liability of
a second defendant. See Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 167-71 & 171 n.95
(3d Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). In overturning the court
of appeals' reversal of the trial court's forum non conveniens dismissal, the Supreme
Court did not question the court of appeals' choice-of-law determination. See 454 U.S.
at 260.
3 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947).
" Most critical scrutiny of the doctrine came at the time of its adoption by the
Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). In particular, Alex-
ander Bickel's 1949 study of the use of forum non conveniens in admiralty concluded
that limits on forum shopping should be addressed through formal venue rules, rather
than by permitting the discretionary circumvention of venue rules by trial judges apply-
ing the forum non conveniens doctrine. See Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Con-
veniens as Applied in the Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 CORNELL L.Q.
12, 16-19, 26 (1949). Bickel observed that the use of the doctrine in admiralty had been
capricious as far back as 1801. See id. at 13. In accord with the conclusions reached
herein, he urged the adoption of clear rules for the handling of discrete classes of cases.
See id. at 47; see also Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARv. L. REV.
908, 930 (1947) (doctrine is "amorphous" and serves inconsistent ends); Currie,
Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. CH. L. REV. 405, 416 (1955)
(doctrine is "notoriously complex and uncertain," resulting in "appalling" delays in
selecting the appropriate forum). More recently, Judge Henry Friendly attacked the
result in Reyno for vesting completely in the discretion of trial judges decisions that
could appropriately be reviewed by appellate courts. See Friendly, Indiscretion About
Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747 (1982).
' There have been a number of other studies of the topic. See Barrett, The Doc-
trine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 380 (1947); Bickel, supra note 4;
Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1929); Braucher, supra note 4; Currie, supra note 4; Dainow, The Inap-
propriate Forum, 29 ILL. L. REV. 867 (1935); Friendly, supra note 4; Inglis,Jurisdic-
tion, The Doctrine of Forum Conveniens, and Choice of Law in Conflict of Laws, 81
L.Q. REV. 380 (1965); Morley, Forum Non Conveniens: Restraining Long-Arm Ju-
risdiction, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 24 (1973); Note, Forum Non Conveniens and the "In-
ternal Affairs" of a Foreign Corporation, 33 COLUM. -L. REV. 492 (1933); Note, Fo-
rum Non Conveniens and Foreign Plaintiffs: Addressing the Unanswered Questions
of Reyno, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 577 (1983); Note, Forum Non Conveniens and
Foreign Plaintiffs in the Federal Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 1257 (1983); Note, The Con-
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conveniens in the United States.
In the last forty years, an upheaval in the procedural law of pri-
vate international and interstate disputes has occurred. Every doctrine
used to mediate between jurisdictions competing to resolve lawsuits
having interstate connections-jurisdiction, venue, and choice of
law-has undergone dramatic change.6 Both jurisdiction and venue
have been greatly expanded, and the conflicts rules have become more
diverse and manipulable. A litigant today has a greater chance of get-
ting into a more desirable court and a better chance that the court will
apply different law than would be applied by an alternative forum.'
The net effect of these changes has been to increase the opportunities
and incentives for parties to forum shop-to attempt to have their cases
resolved in a forum with laws or judges most hospitable to them. The
choice of forum has thus become a key strategic battle fought to in-
crease the chances of prevailing on the merits.'
Most courts reviewing choice-of-law decisions, particularly the
federal courts, in which many interstate cases are heard, have not re-
sponded to this forum shopping by prohibiting forum courts from ap-
plying their own law when the forum's connection with the controversy
is tenuous.9 Similarly, while there has been some retrenchment in the
venient Forum Abroad, 20 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1967); Note, The Convenient Forum
Abroad Revisited: A Decade of Development of the Doctrine of Forum Non Con-
veniens in International Litigation in the Federal Courts, 17 VA. J. OF INT'L L. 755
(1977); Comment, Forum Non Conveniens, A New Federal Doctrine, 56 YALE L.J.
1234 (1947). The doctrine has for the most part been enthusiastically embraced in the
literature, with the notable exception of Alexander Bickel's 1949 study. See Bickel,
supra note 4.
6 See generally Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 772 (1983) (providing an exhaustive history of the development of choice of law
and personal jurisdiction in the last fifty years).
7 See id. at 778-81.
8 See, for example, Irish Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Aer Lingus Teoranta, 739 F.2d 90 (2d
Cir. 1984), in which the court stated,
In some instances ... invocation of the [forum non conveniens] doctrine
will send the case to a jurisdiction which has imposed such severe mone-
tary limitations on recovery as to eliminate the likelihood that the case will
be tried. When it is obvious that this will occur, discussion of convenience
of witnesses takes on a Kafkaesque quality-everyone knows that no wit-
nesses ever will be called to testify.
Id. at 91. See also Coddington & Hicks, The Arena: Defendant's Choice of Forum, 46
J. OF Am L. & CoM. 941 (1981); Kennelly, Choice of Laws, Jurisdiction and Forum
Non Conveniens, 26 TRIAL LAw. GUIDE 260 (1982).
9 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). In Allstate, the Court
upheld Minnesota's choice of its own law in a case in which the state had tenuous
connections with the controversy. The litigation's principal contact with the state was
that the plaintiff had moved there after the cause of action arose. See generally Sympo-
sium: Supreme Court Intervention in Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: From Shaffer to
Allstate, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 837 (1981) (a collection of four articles covering a spec-
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area of jurisdiction,'0 courts continue to assert jurisdiction over cases in
which the only reason that the forum was chosen was to take advantage
of the applicable law." The judicial tendency has increasingly been to
employ the doctrine of forum non conveniens,' 2 the principle that a
court may decline to exercise jurisdiction properly belonging to it when
trial elsewhere would be more "appropriate." Although frequently as-
sociated with "convenience,"'" the doctrine has not been limited in ap-
plication to insuring a convenient trial. Rather, courts invoking the doc-
trine have taken into consideration the very question purportedly
addressed by jurisdiction, venue, and choice of law: which government
has the appropriate relationship to the parties and the controversy to
justify resolving the dispute in its courts or under its law. A forum non
conveniens "interest analysis" has thus been employed to resolve the
interstate dilemma left undecided by the doctrines designed to mediate
trum of views on the proper role of the Constitution in choice of law); Symposium:
Choice-of-Laws Theory After Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1
(1981) (exploring the impact of Allstate on choice-of-law doctrine).
10 See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 104 S. Ct. 1868,
1874 (1984) (company that purchased 80% of its helicopter fleet, trained most of its
personnel, and received payments for over $5,000,000 in the forum was not subject to
jurisdiction for an accident arising out of a transport contract negotiated in the forum);
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (the state in which
foreign plaintiffs brought a products-liability suit involving a car accident occurring in
the state could not exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign retailer and wholesaler
that did no business in the state or with its citizens); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320
(1980) (a state cannot exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction over a defendant who person-
ally has no forum contacts by attaching the contractual obligation of his insurer, who
does business in the state, to indemnify the defendant in connection with the suit);
Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (the state in which the plain-
tiff resided could not exercise in personam jurisdiction over her former husband, a dom-
iciliary of another state, in an action to increase child support; the fact that the former
husband sent his daughter to live with the plaintiff was not sufficient to establish mini-
mum contacts with the forum state); see also Korn, supra note 6, at 785.
"' For instance, in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984), the
Court held that the defendant corporation could be sued in New Hampshire for nation-
wide damages in a libel action when the plaintiff was not from the forum state and the
litigation's sole connection with the forum was the distribution of the defendant's maga-
zine in the forum. The plaintiff's choice of forum was apparently based exclusively on
the fact that any other state's statute of limitations would have barred her action. See
id. at 1477. The Court dismissed the plaintiff's motive for choosing the forum as irrele-
vant, concluding that which statute of limitations could be constitutionally applied was
a choice-of-law issue not yet ripe for review. See id. at 1480.
12 The number of reported forum non conveniens decisions in the federal courts
appears to have risen dramatically in the last five to ten years. See infra notes 216-20
and accompanying text. This is especially odd because, as a number of courts and
commentators have noted, the focus on convenience ought to be of less concern as the
technology of communication and transportation advances. See, e.g., Silberman, Can
the State of Minnesota Bind the Nation?: Federal Choice-of-Law Constraints After
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10 HoFsTRA L. REv. 103, 116 (1981). Yet the num-
ber of forum non conveniens decisions has increased with the relative mobility of proof.
's See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 4, at 753.
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between conflicting laws and jurisdictions. So used, the forum non con-
veniens doctrine has come to accommodate the collective shortcomings
and excesses of modern rules governing jurisdiction, venue, and choice
of law.
This buck passing has created an anomaly: a court of proper stat-
utory venue, possessing jurisdictional power, and having sufficient con-
nection with the controversy to justify applying its own law, may still
dismiss the case because it is an "inappropriate" forum. But the effects
are more profound than the simple operation of a sleight-of-hand shell
game. The courts have not only moved the relevant limits on a court's
power from the jurisdiction or conflict-of-laws shell to a shell with a
Latin name. More significantly, they have delegated those decisions to
the trial judges' discretion without providing any meaningful guidance
or appellate review. Unlike jurisdictional or choice-of-law rulings, fo-
rum non conveniens decisions are vested in the "sound discretion of the
trial court."'14 Furthermore, the standards governing forum non con-
veniens dismissals are composed of a vague assortment of general policy
considerations having perhaps even less substance and clarity than the
minimum-contacts analysis employed in personal-jurisdiction decisions.
Consequently, forum non conveniens decisions tend to be a mechanical
litany of the seminal Supreme Court language 5 followed by a sum-
mary conclusion. The result has been a crazy quilt of ad hoc, capri-
cious, and inconsistent decisions.
This Article explores the implications of the use of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens. Part I considers the theoretical relationship be-
tween the various standards used to control access to courts, concluding
that the distinctions between subject-matter jurisdiction, personal juris-
diction, venue, and forum non conveniens are not sufficiently clear to
justify the difference in procedural treatment accorded each doctrine.
The second part traces the development of forum non conveniens doc-
trine in the United States in an attempt to understand how and why
this doctrinal redundancy has evolved. I suggest that the doctrine was a
direct response to changing conceptions of jurisdiction and venue in
midcentury and was employed to address problems generated by those
changes. The two major Supreme Court discussions of the doctrine are
critically evaluated, and I conclude that the Court's justifications for
permitting the informal circumvention of formal rules through the fo-
rum non conveniens doctrine are not persuasive. The last section
14 Reyno, 454 U.S. at 257.
15 The Supreme Court first articulated the relevant factors in Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947). The decision in Gulf Oil is discussed at length in
Part II-B of this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 134-75.
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surveys the use of the doctrine in the lower federal and state courts and
demonstrates how the doctrine has resulted in an arbitrary and incon-
sistent resolution of important substantive issues. The Article in conclu-
sion urges decreased reliance on forum non conveniens as a means of
allocating political authority and proposes a return to jurisdictional
rules that reflect the policy choices currently made in the guise of fo-
rum non conveniens dismissals.
I. THE REDUNDANCY OF COURT-ACCESS DOCTRINE: WHY FIRST-
YEAR CIVIL PROCEDURE WAS So CONFUSING
American procedure has developed a four-part hierarchy to de-
scribe limitations on a court's ability to resolve a lawsuit: subject-matter
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, venue, and forum non conveniens. A
particular doctrine's position in the hierarchy will determine when and
whether a party can raise the limitation as an objection to the proceed-
ing,"' the degree of appellate scrutiny over the trial court's ruling,"7 the
res judicata effect of the judgment,18 and, in certain cases, even the de-
16 An objection to venue or personal jurisdiction must be raised as the defendant's
first action or waived. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 1361, at 642-43 (1969). A subject-matter defect may be raised at any time,
even on appeal. Id. at 644. The timing for forum non conveniens motions is less clear.
Such motions are not considered objections to venue under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 12(b)(3), and thus may be filed either before or after the answer to the complaint.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3); 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 1361, at 237
(Supp. 1983). Some litigants have even succeeded in raising forum non conveniens ob-
jections after trial. 15 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 3828, at 180 (1976); see, e.g., Snam Progetti S.P.A. v. Lauro Lines, 387 F.
Supp. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding that a motion to dismiss on forum non con-
veniens grounds may be addressed at any time); Fifth and Walnut, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc.
76 F. Supp. 64, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) ("The objection of forum non conveniens ...
may be addressed to the discretion of the court at any time.").
17 Subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and venue rulings are all sub-
ject to normal appellate review. 15 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 16, § 3914;
C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 44, at 264 (4th ed. 1983). While denials of
motions to dismiss are not normally appealable final orders, the objection is preserved
even after trial on the merits. See 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 16, § 1351,
at 567-69. Forum non conveniens rulings, in contrast, are reversible only on a finding
of an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Reyno, 454 U.S. at 257. Moreover, when a
forum non conveniens motion has been denied and the case has proceeded to trial, the
ruling is practically, if not technically, insulated from appellate review; a defendant
would be hard-pressed to show that the balance of public and private convenience
weighs in favor of relitigation in another forum after there has been a trial on the
merits.
18 When a court proceeds to judgment in a case in which venue or jurisdiction was
improper, the validity of the judgment depends upon the exact nature of the defect.
Whether a judgment rendered by a court that was without proper subject-matter juris-
diction may be collaterally challenged depends on a variety of factors, such as whether
an objection was made, how clear the lack of jurisdiction was, and whether the court
was one of limited jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 10 (1982).
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gree of constitutional scrutiny over the decision."9
At the top of the hierarchy is subject-matter jurisdiction: the scope
of a court's "competency" to adjudicate given "types" of lawsuits. This
"competency" is seen as somehow distinct from the particular contro-
versy or litigants; it implicates the very integrity of the court. Objec-
tions to subject-matter defects cannot be waived, and subject-matter ju-
risdiction cannot be conferred on the court by the parties. 0 Subject-
matter jurisdiction is perceived as fundamentally different from the
other doctrines insofar as it addresses institutional policies-the alloca-
tion of power between state and federal governments in the case of fed-
eral subject-matter jurisdiction, or the allocation of authority within a
Judgments predicated on faulty personal jurisdiction may never be collaterally attacked
if the defendant made a general appearance in the first action. Id. § 11. However, a
default judgment may be collaterally challenged for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. §
13. Improper venue, or the inappropriateness of the forum under forum non conveniens
principles, cannot be the basis of a collateral attack. 18 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4436, at 346 (1981).
Moreover, there may be some differences in the finality of an express ruling on
these procedural objections. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) does not consider
dismissals for lack of jurisdiction and for improper venue as decisions upon the merits.
Nevertheless, those rulings do receive varying degrees of respect from other courts. A
ruling that there is no subject-matter jurisdiction in a given court system should pre-
clude an attempt to reassert the same claim anywhere else in the system. See 18 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 4403, at 11. An action dismissed because the defen-
dant had insufficient contacts with the forum to withstand constitutional scrutiny
should be binding on all other courts within the jurisdiction-both state and federal.
However, if the objection is based on a claim of forum non conveniens, a federal court's
disposition will not be binding on state courts even in the same state, and vice versa. See
Bewers v. American Home Prods. Corp., 99 A.D.2d 949, 950, 472 N.Y.S.2d 637, 639
(dismissal of actions based on same facts in federal courts in New York was "not in any
way critical" to the court's decision), affid, 64 N.Y.2d 630, 474 N.E.2d 247, 485
N.Y.S.2d 39 (1984).
19 Compare FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 257 (5th Cir. 1981) (no
due process right to dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens where minimum
contacts sufficient to support personal jurisdiction) with World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (action may be dismissed absent sufficient
minimum contacts even if forum would be convenient).
20 Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982); see also
5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 16, § 1393, at 863-67. This black-letter rule
is something of an overstatement: if neither the court nor the parties object to the
court's subject-matter jurisdiction, either at trial or on appeal, the judgment will usu-
ally withstand collateral attack. See, e.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 112, 116
(1963) (holding that the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction could not be relitigated in a
federal district court in Missouri when the Nebraska Supreme Court had already de-
cided the issue); Des Moines Navigation & R.R. Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U.S.
552, 558-59 (1877) (holding that, if an action is removed to a federal court and all
defendants appear without making an objection to jurisdiction, any final judgment of
the federal court remains in effect unless vacated, even though it appears from ,the
record that complete diversity of citizenship did not exist); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (1982) (except in limited circumstances, "[w]hen a
court has rendered a judgment in a contested action, the judgment precludes the parties
from litigating the question of the court's subject matter jurisdiction").
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unitary system in the case of state or federal courts of limited
competence.
Next in line is personal jurisdiction, which determines the "terri-
torial reach" of the court's "power." Like subject-matter jurisdiction,
personal jurisdiction is viewed as intrinsic to the court, but it is not an
inviolable limitation. A party can "come into" the "territory" of the
court, but she cannot submit a controversy to a court lacking subject-
matter jurisdiction over that type of controversy. 21 Unlike objections to
subject-matter jurisdiction, objections based on lack of personal jurisdic-
tion will be waived if they are not raised early in the litigation.22 Per-
sonal jurisdiction is distinguished from subject-matter jurisdiction by its
focus on the present or past location of the defendant and its purported
indifference to the character of the controversy.
Third is venue, the "appropriate" place for trial within a given
jurisdiction. Whereas personal jurisdiction represents an allocation of
judicial power among different sovereign jurisdictions, venue allocates
judicial authority within a single sovereign jurisdiction. Accordingly,
state venue rules allocate judicial authority only within the state, and
federal venue rules allocate judicial authority among the different fed-
eral districts within the United States. Unlike personal or subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction, venue is not seen as going to the "power" of the court
but rather representg some extrinsic "right" or privilege vested in the
parties themselves.2" Thus, venue privileges are easily waived.
Last in the hierarchy is forum non conveniens. A forum non con-
veniens dismissal is predicated on jurisdiction and venue being properly
established and represents an "escape valve" to insure that rigid appli-
cation of those rules will not result in unfairness in an unusual fact
situation. The trial judge provides some "play in the joints" that par-
tially offsets the indeterminism of formal rules.24 Forum non con-
veniens is a hybrid combining both institutional and private-party in-
terests. While it is ostensibly available to protect a defendant from a
burdensome or otherwise inconvenient choice of forum by the plaintiff,
it may be employed to give effect to the policies underlying the other
2 See Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).
22 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h).
23 See Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68 (1939);
see also 1 J. MOORE, J. LucAs, H. FINK, D. WECOSTEIN & J. WICKER, MOORE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.140[1.-2], at 1310-12 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as 1 J.
MOORE].
24 A number of commentators have urged increased reliance on the doctrine ex-
pres sly because it gives the courts more flexibility to adjust the equities of cases eluding
fair resolution through jurisdiction or venue rules. See, e.g., Dainow, supra note 5, at
869-70, 886-87; Morley, supra note 5, at 37; Silberman, supra note 12, at 116.
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doctrines in the hierarchy.25
Any first-year law student can attest that however well ingrained
these distinctions are in the legal mind, the commonsense differences
are far from obvious.2 6 Commentators tend to define the doctrines by
describing the differences in procedural treatment each is accorded: per-
sonal jurisdiction may be waived, subject-matter jurisdiction may not; a
judgment may be voided for lack of personal jurisdiction but not for
improper venue, and so on.2 7 Such differences in procedural treatment
25 See, e.g., Harrison v. Wyeth Laboratories, 510 F. Supp. 1, 2, 4, 9 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (product-liability action against pharmaceutical manufacturer by British plain-
tiffs should be dismissed subject to specified conditions that give effect to British regula-
tory interests), affd, 676 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1982).
2" The confusion is apparently not limited to first-year law students. In a recent
federal district court opinion, the court analyzed whether the plaintiff had brought a
cause of action "arising out of . . . [defendant's] business" in the state in order to
determine whether the court had "subject matter jurisdiction" under the state long-arm
statute. See Apolinario v. Avco Corp., 561 F. Supp. 608, 611 (D. Conn. 1982). The
characterization was apparently deliberate; the court emphasized that "'[tihe concepts
of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. . . serve different purposes.'" Id. (quoting
Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982)). A foreign
corporation's amenability to suit would normally be considered a matter of personal
rather than subject-matter jurisdiction, but, as discussed below, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 31-37, and as demonstrated by this case, the distinction is not a necessary
one.
27 See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. Consider Professor Moore's ex-
planation of the distinction between the various doctrines. He first sets out totally tau-
tological definitions:
[T]he concepts underlying jurisdiction and venue are quite different and
should not be confused with each other. . . . [Flederal jurisdiction of the
subject matter relates to the power of the court to hear and determine the
matter in litigation. In personam, in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction
relate to the court's power over the person or the property of the defen-
dant. Venue, on the other hand, relates to the locality of a lawsuit, the
forum where judicial power may be set in motion, but it does not limit the
jurisdiction of the court.
1 J. MOORE, supra note 23, 0.140[1.-2] at 1310-11 (footnotes omitted). It is ques-
tionable whether anyone not steeped in procedural formalism would perceive the dis-
tinctions between whether a court has "power. . . to hear and determine the matter in
litigation," whether it has "power over. . the defendant," and whether it is a "forum
where judicial power may be set in motion." All three questions ask the same thing:
does this court have the authority to resolve this controversy?
In attempting to clarify the distinction, Professor Moore relies exclusively on the
different procedural characteristics assigned to the doctrines and not on any underlying
conceptual distinctions:
A vital distinction is apparent when we consider the doctrine of waiver.
Federal jurisdictional requirements can not be waived by the parties. Lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter will even be raised by the courts,
including the appellate courts, on their own motion. But venue is a privi-
lege personal to each defendant which he can and does waive unless he
makes proper and timely objection; and this rule applies to the United
States. Lack of federal jurisdiction will always lead to dismissal of the
action whereas improper venue may lead to dismissal, but usually it
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presumably reflect differences in the political or social values underly-
ing each doctrine. Subject-matter jurisdiction may not be waived be-
cause it advances a policy more important than, or at least significantly
different from, the policy furthered by personal jurisdiction or venue.28
Once the differences in procedural treatment of each doctrine are set
aside, however, the qualitative differences that remain are surprisingly
subtle; the differences in procedural treatment then become much more
difficult to justify.
Subject-matter jurisdiction is a particularly elusive concept. It re-
fers to the authority to adjudicate certain "types" of controversies, yet
"type" does not necessarily mean the nature of the cause of action. It
may refer to the amount in controversy or the identity or citizenship of
the litigants. Under such a broad construction, "type" simply means
some characteristic of the litigation that will determine whether the
court has authority to hear the case, a definition that could well enc.om-
pass those characteristics on which personal jurisdiction and venue are
based.29
For instance, consider the personal-jurisdiction requirement that
the defendant either must be served within the state or must have cer-
tain minimum contacts with the state. Assuming the sufficiency of those
contacts, we would normally say in such a case that the court has juris-
diction "over the person," not over the subject matter of the case. In one
respect that is a sensible distinction: the plaintiff still must satisfy statu-
tory "subject matter" requirements in order to establish that the court
has authority to proceed-for example, that the amount in controversy
falls within the court's jurisdictional threshold, that the cause of action
is of a type the court has authority to resolve, or perhaps that the law-
suit is between diverse parties. In another sense, however, the classifica-
tion is quite artificial. The requirement of minimum contacts with the
defendant is not different in kind from the requirement that the parties
should result in a transfer to the proper district. Another relationship is
that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdic-
tion is authorized by statute and the selected forum is proper under the
venue statutes. Such resistance is recognized by the doctrine of forum non
conveniens ....
1 J. MOORE, supra note 23, 0.140[1.-2], at 1311-12 (footnotes omitted).
2 The Supreme Court, in Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S.
694, 702 (1982), explained why personal jurisdiction can be waived, but subject-matter
jurisdiction cannot, as follows: subject-matter jurisdiction "functions as a restriction on
federal power, and contributes to the characterization of the federal sovereign," whereas
personal jurisdiction "represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sov-
ereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty."
2 Indeed, the same contacts provide the court with both subject-matter and per-
sonal jurisdiction in custody cases and sovereign-immunity cases. See Lilly, Jurisdiction
over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85, 121 (1983).
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come from different states. Both are characteristics of the litigation that
authorize resolution of a particular lawsuit in a particular court.
The different "types" of subject-matter jurisdiction do share a
common purpose: each "type" represents a reason to have one court or
set of courts hear the case rather than another. Certain judges may
have more expertise in a particular area of law; certain cases may not
be important enough to justify expending a given court's resources; one
court may be more impartial than another. A set of institutional con-
cerns, above and beyond the interests of the parties in a fair and just
adjudication, is thus addressed through subject-matter jurisdiction.30
Yet even in this sense there is no reason why the location of the
relevant contacts, the residence of the parties, or the place of service of
process, traditionally characteristics of personal jurisdiction and venue,
could not also be considered to address such institutional concerns. Both
personal jurisdiction and venue reflect notions of the proper division of
power between courts. The "minimum contacts" test employed after
International Shoe Co. v. Washington 1 to determine whether an as-
sertion of personal jurisdiction is constitutional does not simply evaluate
whether it would be "inconvenient" for the defendant to litigate in the
forum. Rather, the doctrine calls for considering whether the forum's
relationship to the particular controversy in question justifies assertion
of the forum's judicial power beyond its border,32 that is, whether the
state has a sufficient regulatory stake in the activity in question to jus-
tify the extraterritorial reach of its judicial power. 3 Implicit in that
'0 Note, however, that in the case of diversity jurisdiction the justification for the
existence of the federal court's competency is coincidental with the private interests of
the litigants in receiving a fair adjudication. The same might also be said for the "ex-
pertise" justification for a court's assertion of subject-matter jurisdiction: the parties get
a higher-quality adjudication.
31 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
32 Cf Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1479 (1984) ("the 'fair-
ness' of haling respondent into a New Hampshire court depends to some extent on
whether respondent's activities relating to New Hampshire. . .give that State a legiti-
mate interest in holding respondent answerable on a claim related to those activities");
Calder v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 1487 (1984) (jurisdiction may properly be based on
an injury within the state that is caused by the defendants' out-of-state conduct).
" See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court
Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 77; Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction
Finally Exceeds Its Reach: A Comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C.L. Rav. 407 (1980); McDougal, Judicial Jurisdiction:
From a Contacts to an Interest Analysis, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1982). But see Drobak,
The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IowA L. REV. 1015 (1983). Pro-
fessor Drobak argues that the proper focus of jurisdiction is on fairness to the individ-
ual, not on the relationship between sovereign powers. This, he contends, explains why
objections to defects in personal jurisdiction may be waived by the parties, as was done
in Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694 (1982). See Drobak,
supra, at 1015-16. However, in so arguing, he does not in any sense contend that state
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consideration is a theory of how sovereign power is properly allocated
among the states.3 4 The due process clause is a relevant consideration
even when the defendant would experience no hardship in coming into
the jurisdiction3 5 and has no application to assertions of jurisdiction
over defendants within the forum even when it would be unfair and
inconvenient to drag a defendant across a large state.3 6 Personal juris-
diction thus reflects institutional concerns about the proper allocation of
authority among sovereigns in much the same way that subject-matter
jurisdiction addresses the proper allocation of authority among courts.37
borders are irrelevant, nor does he assert that the only consideration in personal juris-
diction is convenience to the parties. Rather, he acknowledges that policies of federalism
and state sovereignty are advanced by vesting in individuals the "personal right to be
free from the judicial authority of states lacking minimum contacts." Id. at 1065. Thus,
Professor Drobak does not take issue with my premise that the law of personal jurisdic-
tion reflects institutional concerns about the proper division of authority between sover-
eigns, albeit as an indirect result of enforcing personal rights. The point here is that
this personal right is not different in kind from the right to object to the subject-matter
jurisdiction, venue, or inappropriateness of the forum.
a, Cf Brilmayer, supra note 33, at 112; McDougal, supra note 33, at 8-10.
The Supreme Court has stated that
[e]ven if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from
being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the
forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy;
even if the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the
Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may
sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (citing Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958)).
"6 See Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 184 (2d Cir. 1967) (stat-
ing in dictum that a New York City newspaper must respond to actions in all other
cities in the state).
"' The Supreme Court's decision in Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites,
456 U.S. 694 (1982), while demonstrating the circularity of the distinctions between
personal and subject-matter jurisdiction, does not affect this analysis. In order to ex-
plain why personal jurisdiction could be conferred on the court by the parties when
subject-matter jurisdiction could not, the Court, as discussed supra note 28, decided
that limits on personal jurisdiction were "ultimately a function of the individual liberty
interest" rather than a function of federalism. See 456 U.S. at 702, 703 n.10. Accord-
ingly, individuals could surrender those rights without affecting political relationships
between sovereigns. In order to support that conclusion, the Court, closing the circle,
observed that "if the federalism concept operated as an independent restriction on the
sovereign power of the court, it would not be possible to waive the personal jurisdiction
requirement." Id. at 703 n.10. As demonstrated by Professor Drobak, see supra note
33, and as discussed above, the Court's characterization does not mean that institutional
relationships between states are irrelevant to limits on personal jurisdiction. One could
not explain the current law governing personal jurisdiction without reference to limits
on the states' sovereign power and legitimate regulatory interests. Few seem to be sug-
gesting that what the Court meant in Compagnie des Bauxites was that due process is
merely a function of convenience and that state lines are otherwise irrelevant. Rather,
the debate centers on the rather metaphysical, if not wholly semantic, question whether
the "federalism" interest is an individual, waivable right, or whether it independently
constrains a court's power if not asserted as an individual defense.
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Although not as clearly political, the venue rules also involve legis-
lative choices about which courts have the authority to resolve a given
lawsuit. Focused perhaps more on the private interests of the litigants
than on the distribution of sovereign authority, venue rules nevertheless
reflect decisions about how to allocate judicial resources as well as how
to adjust the relative power of the parties to select the forum. A given
venue rule may be intended to deal with the problem of crowded court
dockets or to provide certain economic benefits for the bar, not simply
to serve the convenience of the parties.3 8 It is difficult to reconcile such
purposes with the characterization of venue as a matter of private privi-
lege not implicating broader institutional concerns. Again, is the deci-
sion whether to resolve a dispute in one county rather than another
significantly different from the decision to hear the case in a small-
claims court rather than a court of general jurisdiction?
This is not to say that significant policies, distinct from those sup-
porting specific forms of personal jurisdiction or venue, do not underlie
the rules concerning subject-matter jurisdiction. The same, however,
could be said for different types of subject-matter jurisdiction; the poli-
cies animating a jurisdictional-amount rule are significantly different
from the policies behind federal-question jurisdiction. 9 What this does
say is that the hierarchy of procedural limitations on courts' authority
is composed of crude categories and that the social and political values
they reflect overlap considerably. It is unreasonable, therefore, that the
procedural characteristics and ramifications of the various doctrines
should differ so drastically; the procedural effects of a given doctrine
should be proportionate to the importance of the policies behind it.
40
The significance of this overlap is that most of the policies ad-
dressed in decisions about jurisdiction and venue are also addressed in
the context of forum non conveniens, a doctrine practically devoid of
hard rules, vested in the discretion of the trial court, and beyond effec-
38 For instance, in 1946 Congress considered amending the venue rules for suits
under the Federal Employer Liability Act (FELA) to eliminate the plaintiff's right to
pursue a claim in any forum in which the defendant happened to do business. See H.R.
1639, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7, 93 CONG. REc. 9180 (1947) (Jennings Bill). The
debate in Congress focused on how solicitation of lawsuits by unscrupulous attorneys
had diverted FELA litigation to several large cities. See 93 CONG. Rc. 9180-83
(1947).
" See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) (federal-question jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1982) (requiring a minimum amount in controversy when jurisdiction is based on di-
versity of citizenship).
40 Cf Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Fed-
eral Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 449-50 (1981) ("Instead of pigeonholing, we
should directly face these questions of procedure, res judicata, waiver, and default, rec-
ognizing that the answers may vary with the nature and importance of the particular
venue rule under examination.").
19851
794 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
tive appellate review. As with decisions governing subject-matter juris-
diction and personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens decisions may
quite explicitly turn on determining which sovereign has the most sig-
nificant relationship to the controversy-a question no less institutional
or political than any inquiry based on personal or subject-matter juris-
diction. To the extent that the doctrine does not implicate institutional
concerns, it focuses on fairness and inconvenience to the parties, matters
also purportedly dealt with by venue rules and addressed by due pro-
cess review of assertions of personal jurisdiction.4
The net effect is that policies advanced under a jurisdictional doc-
trine can be nullified by a subsequent forum non conveniens ruling.
The forum non conveniens decision will not be subject to the con-
straints of precedent and appellate review that defined those policies in
the jurisdictional context.
Acceptance of this doctrinal redundancy seems to be predicated on
a model that portrays the four court-access doctrines as four layers of
refinement, like an increasingly fine series of filters. Only cases tlhat get
by the preliminary jurisdictional filters pass through to the forum non
conveniens filter. Because the preliminary filters are based on rules
rather than on pure judicial discretion, the impression of maintaining a
rule-based system for court access is preserved. Moreover, it appears
that operation of the forum non conveniens doctrine will at worst reject
a case that ought to be retained; even an irrational forum non con-
veniens doctrine cannot result in the assertion of jurisdiction over a case
rejected by the jurisdictional filters.
This model is flawed. While it is certainly true that numerous
cases fall outside of the courts' personal or subject-matter jurisdiction,
numerous other cases are dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds
because, while satisfying vague notions of "minimum contacts" or "fun-
damental fairness," they nevertheless lack sufficient connection with the
forum to justify assertion of jurisdiction or application of the forum's
"' See Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 1966) (both jurisdic-
tion and venue are designed to ensure fairness and limit inconvenience to the defen-
dant). Indeed, a number of commentators propose substituting a pure convenience anal-
ysis for jurisdictional rules. See, e.g., Seidelson, Recasting World-Wide Volkswagen As
a Source of Longer Jurisdictional Reach, 19 TULSA L.J. 1, 2-3 (1983); cf. Silberman,
supra note 12, at 116 (arguing that jurisdictional determinations should be made under
the forum non conveniens rubric according to the convenience of litigating in a particu-
lar forum; only limitations placed on choice of law should involve balancing the inter-
ests of plaintiffs and defendants); von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudi-
cate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1166-67 (1966) (whether
jurisdiction is appropriate should depend on considerations of convenience and jurisdic-
tional bias in favor of the defendant, rather than on the court's power over persons and
things).
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law. In short, the very qualities presumably considered under jurisdic-
tional rules are again considered under forum non conveniens because
the jurisdictional rules were underinclusive: the rules were not effective
in selecting those cases that were appropriate or inappropriate for reso-
lution in the forum. In other words, someone has cut a hole in the
jurisdictional filter."2
Thus, while forum non conveniens technically cannot authorize ju-
risdiction greater than that permitted by jurisdictional rules, it in fact
assumes the function of separating cases according to the forum's stake
in resolving the dispute. Cases with the requisite formal territorial con-
tacts bypass jurisdictional testing only to be carefully scrutinized under
forum non conveniens "analysis." The net effect of this is that rather
weighty "jurisdictional" issues are resolved in an informal forum non
conveniens context. Furthermore, such an application of the forum non
conveniens doctrine has the additional, untoward effect of retarding the
development of formal court-access doctrine. A body of .arbitrary and
inconsistent decisions regarding court access is hidden behind a doctrine
that has as its only formal standard the discretion of the trial court in
determining whether retention of the cases is "appropriate." The in-
consistency of results is accommodated by the imprecision of the
doctrine.
The result of this procedural structure is that policies established
pursuant to formal precedent and developed under one set of proce-
dural rules can be reevaluated pursuant to a different set of procedural
rules without the restraints of the same precedent. Difficult and impor-
tant choices about court access and governmental interests are thus
made in an informal, arbitrary, and inconsistent fashion. The next part
of this Article suggests how such a seemingly illogical construct for con-
trolling court access emerged.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FORUM NON CONVENIENS DOCTRINE
IN THE UNITED STATES
The doctrinal redundancy of the various court-access doctrines and
the differences in the procedural ramifications of each doctrine appear
42 The venue filter in federal court has apparently been purposely cut so that
cases slipping through the personal-jurisdiction filter will not be excluded because of
improper venue. As notions of personal jurisdiction expanded in the wake of Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), both the courts and Congress took
steps to insure that definitions of venue would keep up with broadened notions of per-
sonal jurisdiction. Congress amended the venue statute to provide proper venue in any
place where the defendant was "doing business," and the courts interpreted the venue
provisions to be coincidental with amenability to service of process under jurisdictional
rules. See, e.g., Fraley v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 397 F.2d I (3d Cir. 1968).
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to be in significant measure the result of historical accident. As jurisdic-
tion and venue evolved and adapted to the American judicial system,
the doctrines were employed to serve diverse and changing social and
political policies. Jurisdiction and venue both changed in substance, but
they retained formal characteristics tied to archaic conceptions of them.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens developed in the United States in
direct response to the evolution of jurisdiction and venue and helped fill
the growing gap between the form and substance of those doctrines.
Although bearing a Latin name, the forum non conveniens doc-
trine is of relatively recent origin. Not until 1948 was the doctrine ac-
cepted for general application in the federal courts, and it received little
or no attention in the state courts until after the federal adoption.4
Both courts and commentators have sought common-law precedent
for the forum non conveniens doctrine in Scottish and British case
law."" Such reliance is not well placed. Even in England and Scotland,
the doctrine is a relatively new invention. The leading British decision
came in 1906 in Logan v. Bank of Scotland4 5 and represented a dra-
matic exception to the cardinal rule at common law of 'udex tenetur
impertiri judicium suum": a judge must exercise jurisdiction in every
case in which he is seized of it."' The Scottish precedents are slightly
4 At least two commentators have asserted that the doctrine has been employed in
state courts since 1817. See Blair, supra note 5, at 3 n.15; Note, Forum Non Con-
veniens and Foreign Plaintiffs: Addressing the Unanswered Questions of Reyno,
supra note 5, at 577 n.1. This conclusion, however, seems questionable. Many of the
state cases cited by these studies involved rules that absolutely denied jurisdiction to
claims brought by out-of-state plaintiffs or were decided under venue provisions that
absolutely barred the action. Braucher, supra note 4, at 912-14; see, e.g., Ellenwood v.
Marietta Chair Co., 158 U.S. 105 (1895); Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660
(C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8411). Such provisions, unlike forum non conveniens, did not
provide the trial courts with discretion; rather, they absolutely precluded assertion of
jurisdiction. See Braucher, supra note 4, at 912-13. Moreover, until 1929 it was
thought that the doctrine was a violation of the privileges and immunities clause of the
Constitution because it tended to have the effect of permitting actions by citizens and
foreclosing actions by noncitizens. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230) (holding that the privileges and immunities clause
protects those privileges and immunities that are "fundamental," including the ability
"to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state"). The Supreme
Court's decision in Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929), *,as
seen as a significant opening of the door for use of the forum non conveniens doctrine
in federal court because it found no privileges and immunities violation in the applica-
tion of the doctrine. See Barrett, supra note 5, at 389-93; Comment, Forum Non Con-
veniens, A New Federal Doctrine, supra note 5, at 1235. Presumably, the privileges
and immunities clause would have imposed a similar restraint on state courts.
"" See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947); Blair, supra
note 5, at 20.
4. [1906] 1 K.B. 141.
46 See A. GIBB, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JURISDICTION IN ENGLAND AND
SCOTLAND 220 (1926). There is some controversy over whether in fact the English
have adopted a general doctrine of forum non conveniens. Some have asserted that the
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older, dating from 186647 (still well after the establishment of the
American judicial system), and like the British cases were acknowl-
edged to be at odds with the established duty of courts to exercise
jurisdiction.
48
Moreover, significant differences between the British and Ameri-
can conceptions of jurisdiction and venue rendered the British and Scot-
tish forum non conveniens doctrines ill-fitting models for the federal
system; there is not the same degree of doctrinal redundancy of jurisdic-
Scottish and British doctrines are functionally identical. See id. at 212. Others have
pointed out that the defendant's burden of proof when making a forum non conveniens
motion in England is considerably heavier than the corresponding burden of a Scottish
defendant. The English defendant must demonstrate "that the continuance of the action
would work an injustice because it would be oppressive or vexatious to him or would be.
an abuse of the process of the Court in some other way," St. Pierre v. South Am.
Stores, Ltd., [1936] 1 K.B. 382, 398, whereas the Scottish defendant may simply estab-
lish that "the interests of the parties would more appropriately be served and the ends
of justice would more appropriately be secured" elsewhere. Credit Chimique v. James
Scott Eng'g Group, 1979 Sess. Cas. 406, 406. See also Boden, Forum Non Conveniens:
An English Reality?, 13 KINGSTON L. REV. 65, 72 (1983) ("Under Scottish law, the
doctrine. . . will be applied and an action stayed when there is a court other than the
domestic (Scottish) one which is more suitable for the ends of justice. By comparison,
. . . an English court may stay an action whenever it is necessary to prevent injus-
tice."); Briggs, Forum Non Conveniens-Now We Are Ten?, 3 LEGAL STUD. 74, 78
(1983) (the traditional English approach requires an "abuse of process," while the
Scottish courts look for the appropriate forum to serve the "ends of justice"); cf. Note,
The Convenient Forum Abroad Revisited, supra note 5, at 764 (some federal circuit
courts follow the British model requiring a showing of "injustice" while others focus on
the "convenience factors" inherent in the Scottish standard).
The doctrine has not been as popular with British as with Scottish or American
courts, possibly because of a different British attitude toward forum shopping. While
the British courts have resented, and have even restrained, British citizens seeking rem-
edies in United States courts, see, e.g., Smith Kline & French Laboratories, Ltd. v.
Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730 (C.A. 1982), they have been more tolerant of foreign
plaintiffs seeking the protection of "enlightened" British law in British courts, see Sil-
berman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of An Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 89 n.288
(1978) ("English courts will apply English law to a contract where, although it has no
relationship to England, the parties have chosen English law.").
47 See Clements v. Macaulay, 1866 Sess. Cas. M. 583. Earlier dismissals under a
doctrine of forum non competens seem to have been limited to specific cases of attempts
to administer foreign estates in Scotland and disputes involving foreign partnerships.
See id. at 592-93. The leading Scottish precedent in the twentieth century is La Soci6t6
du Gaz v. La Soci6t6 Anonyme de Navigation "Les Armateurs Francais," 1926 Sess.
Cas. 13, 14 (holding that "in the interests of the parties and for the ends of justice" the
case at hand would more suitably be tried in France than in Scotland).
48 In Clements v. Macaulay, 1866 Sess. Cas. M. 583, Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis
stated,
[I]n cases in which jurisdiction is competently founded, a Court has no
discretion whether it shall exercise its jurisdiction or not, but is bound to
award the justice which a suitor comes to ask. . . . [T]he plea [of forum
non conveniens] must not be stretched so as to interfere with this general
principle of jurisprudence.
Id. at 593.
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tion, venue, and forum non conveniens doctrine in the United Kingdom
as there is in the United States. Indeed, the distorted American emula-
tion of the British court system in general seems to be a principal cause
of the lack of coherence in American court-access doctrine. Whereas
American law has employed two doctrines to determine the situs of
trial-jurisdiction and venue-the distinction at common law was less
clear. Personal jurisdiction, in the American sense of a limitation on the
territorial reach of a court's power, was not really an issue in England;
the king's arm reached around the world.49 Although a default judg-
ment could not be entered against an absent defendant, the British
courts maintained the power to compel an absent defendant's attend-
ance through distraint of property, or even a declaration of "outlawry"
if the defendant owned no property capable of confiscation.5" Thus, a
defendant was considered within the power or authority of the king's
court even when outside the territorial limits of the country. 1
The British courts, nevertheless, evolved a set of rules to determine
where within the kingdom a case should be heard. Prior to the separa-
tion of king and courts, the answer was simple: trial would be held
wherever the king was sitting.52 Not until the reign of Edward III
(1327-1377) did the courts cease following the king in all cases. 53
After the resolution of lawsuits was delegated to the courts, venue
became slightly more complicated. The earliest venue rules grew out of
the jury system. A specific venue was required in certain "local" ac-
tions thought to require jury members familiar with the facts in contro-
versy . ' Until 1705, in fact, all actions had to be brought in the county
where the cause of action arose or in the county where the evidence was
located. 55 Although the function of the jury eventually changed so that
it was no longer appropriate for jury members to use their own knowl-
9 See Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power"
Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 297-98 (1956).
50 See Blume, Place of Trial of Civil Cases, 48 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1949).
51 See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, supra note 49, at 299. -
5 See Blume, supra note 50, at 5.
See Blume, supra note 50, at 4. By as early as 1172, the records and equipment
of the Court of the Exchequer had become too bulky to be transported around the
country. The Court thus settled in one place for its own convenience and not that of the
parties involved. See Blume, supra note 50, at 3. The other courts gradually followed
suit. See Blume, supra note 50, at 4-5. One of the achievements of the Magna Carta in
1215 was to provide that "[c]ommon pleas shall not follow [the king's] court, but shall
be held in some fixed place." See Blume, supra note 50, at 4.
5 See, e.g., J. GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL
ACTIONS § 103, at 101-03 (Boston 1832); see also 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
RIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 384 (Oxford 1770).
" See R. BOOTE, AN HISTORICAL TREATISE OF AN ACTION OR SUIT AT LAW
97 (London 1766), cited in A. EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
104 n.11 (1962).
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edge to resolve a controversy, the concept of local venue remained, al-
beit as an anachronism. 56 Eventually, all transitory actions could be
brought wherever the defendant was found, but the defendant as a mat-
ter of course could move for transfer to the county where the cause of
action arose, presumably the place where evidence would be most
accessible.
57
The application of these British procedural concepts to the Ameri-
can judicial system proved confusing. Limits on the authority of state
courts were not simply a function of the location of evidence. Rather,
state boundaries represented territorial limits on the power of the sover-
eign, a problem encountered less frequently at common law. 8 English
venue rules could specify places throughout the country where trial
should be held; in America, state venue choices were limited to forums
within the state. If trial outside the state was more appropriate, the
state's courts could only decline jurisdiction: they could not dictate the
appropriate forum. Only a governmental unit with interstate authority
could intercede in disputes between potential forums in different
states.59 This interstate mediation was found in the limits on state juris-
diction imposed by the due process clause.60 Thus, for the state courts,
jurisdiction replaced venue as the primary determinant of the place of
trial on an interstate level. Venue remained in use at the state level to
determine the location of trial within the state.
In the federal system, the power of the courts was not limited by
state boundaries, but the courts did not assume the role of national
adjudicators. Although Congress may have possessed the power to cre-
ate trial courts with nationwide personal jurisdiction,6" it chose instead
to limit the reach of the federal trial courts to that of the state courts.6 2
The Judiciary Act of 1789 limited the "venue" of actions filed in the
federal trial courts to the district in which the defendant was served.63
58 See Blume, supra note 50, at 16-18.
'1 4 & 5 Ann., ch. 16, § 6 (1705) (transitory actions may be brought in any
country), cited in A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 55, at 105.
58 State boundaries were apparently relevant in limiting the assertion of jurisdic-
tion over foreign defendants. See A. GIBB, supra note 46, at 23-26, 193.
11 See Currie, supra note 4, at 422-24.
60 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
61 See Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the Elimination of Personal Jurisdic-
tion in the Federal Courts, 58 IND. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1982); Clermont, supra note 40, at
427; see also Dejames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 286 n.3 (3d Cir.)
(where service of process is accomplished by "wholly federal means," it may be appro-
priate to look to the defendant's contacts with the United States rather than with the
particular forum state), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981); Lilly, supra note 29, at
122-23.
62 See Clermont, supra note 40, at 427-28.
63 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79 (codified as amended
19851
800 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Because each state was assigned a district, and no district crossed state
lines, the jurisdiction of the federal trial courts was coincidental with
that of the states. 4 Furthermore, once the defendant was served, the
federal statute imposed no further limitations on the plaintiff's choice of
forum. Although this statute has been characterized as a rule of
venue,65 it appears to be conceptually identical to a jurisdictional rule:
it did not specify where a given action should be tried, but rather de-
fined the reach of trial-court process. 6
Although the federal government did have the power to specify the
appropriate district for trial, it did not exercise that authority until
1858. The first true venue rule forced the plaintiff to sue in the district
of the defendant's residence.6 7 The only exception was for "local" ac-
tions concerning land, which were considered appropriately resolved
only by a court of the district in which the land was situated.6" This
rule was amended in 1875, and it once again provided for suit wher-
ever the defendant "shall be found." ' In 1888, plaintiffs in diversity
cases were given the option of suing in the district of either the plain-
tiff's or the defendant's place of residence.70 In 1966, the last major
amendment was added, providing venue in the judicial district "in
which the claim arose."1
71
The requirements of venue in the federal courts thus have not re-
mained constant, and the function of venue has never been clearly de-
fined. In theory, venue differs from jurisdiction in that it specifies
where trial should be held, rather than simply where it could be held.
at 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1982)). The statute provided that
no person shall be arrested in one district for trial in another, in any civil
action before a circuit or district court .... And no civil suit shall be
brought before either of said courts against an inhabitant of the United
States, by any original process in any other district than that whereof he is
an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the
writ ....
Id.
1 J. MOORE, supra note 23, 0.140[3], at 1322-24.
65 See Blume, supra note 50, at 38-39.
e6 See Clermont, supra note 40, at 430.
67 See Act of May 4, 1858, ch. 27, § 1, 11 Stat. 272 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1391 (1982)).
68 See id. The statute did not define the distinction between local and transitory
actions but was deemed to incorporate the common-law doctrine. See 1 J. MOORE,
supra note 23, 1 0.142[2.-1], at 1360-70.
6' Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1391 (1982)).
70 See Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, § 1, 25 Stat. 433, 434 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1982)).
71 Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-714, 80 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1982)).
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However, venue never effectively did that. Until 1858 it simply mir-
rored the jurisdictional limits of the courts, and after 1888 it provided a
range of options to the plaintiff without ever indicating where a suit
ought to be brought. It certainly did not promote trial in the fairest,
most efficient, or most convenient forum. As drafted, venue guidelines
had little impact on the place of trial beyond that accomplished by the
limitations imposed by personal jurisdiction.72 This redundancy was
exacerbated as courts reinterpreted statutory venue requirements in the
wake of International Shoe Co. v. Washington"3 to account for ex-
panded conceptions of permissible personal jurisdiction. The definition
of "residence" in the venue statute7 4 was interpreted to be consistent
with amenability to process under long-arm statutes, so that venue was
rarely an independent limitation on a plaintiffs choice of forum.
7 5
While the absence of any meaningful venue limitations on a plain-
tiff's choice of forum may appear to have been conducive to forum
shopping, thereby creating a need for further limits on choices of fo-
rum, the doctrine of forum non conveniens was virtually unheard of,
outside of the admiralty context, prior to 1929.6 This apparent anom-
aly can be explained not only by a presumably smaller number of in-
terstate and international transactions, but also by the existence of ju-
risdictional limits far more rigid than those that exist today. At least
after 1877 and Pennoyer v. Neff,7 jurisdiction was very much tied to a
"power theory" and strict territorialism. 7 ' A court's power was linked
to the geographic limits of the state boundaries; the court possessed ju-
risdiction over persons and property within those boundaries and was
otherwise without jurisdiction. The "two well-established principles of
2 See Currie, supra note 4, at 431; cf. Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions, 43
HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1217 (1930) (arbitrary American venue and jurisdiction rules
were taken from England and were never well adapted to the federal system). See
generally Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 MIcH. L. REv.
307, 307-15 (1951) (analyzing the policy choices reflected in various venue provisions).
73 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
74 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1982).
7 See, e.g., Fraley v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 397 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1968); Hous-
ton Fearless Corp. v. Teter, 318 F.2d 822, 825 (10th Cir. 1963); C. WRIGHT, supra
note 17, § 42, at 242-44; cf. Abrams, supra note 61, at 7-9 (arguing that venue should
not operate as a limitation on choice of forum separate from that imposed by personal
jurisdiction).
76 Paxton Blair, writing in 1929, could find only a handful of court cases in which
the doctrine was even mentioned. See Blair, supra note 5, at 21-30. It was, however,
Blair's contention that the courts had in effect been applying the doctrine in different
contexts without being aware of it, like "Moli~re's M. Jourdain, who found he had
been speaking prose all his life without knowing it." Blair, supra note 5, at 21-22.
7 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
71 See Silberman, supra note 46, at 45-46.
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public law" 79 articulated in Pennoyer-a court's exclusive jurisdiction
over persons and property within state borders and its lack of jurisdic-
tion over persons and property beyond state borders-created a system
in which there was little or no concurrent jurisdiction between states,
and a plaintiff's choice of forum was severely limited. It is therefore not
surprising that the forum non conveniens doctrine was rarely invoked
prior to International Shoe. The doctrine seems to have developed in
response to the enlargement of jurisdictional limits after International
Shoe, as well as to the social and political forces behind this
expansion. 0
The same forces of industrialization and modernization that led
the courts to reconceptualize personal jurisdiction" l resulted in an in-
crease in the business of the courts. By the late 1920's, residents of the
major urban centers, which had undergone rapid industrial expan-
sion,"2 found their courts extremely crowded."3 Although the causes
were no doubt complex, one of the reasons for the congestion was per-
ceived to be the solicitation of lawsuits properly belonging in other dis-
tricts. 4 It was believed that the courts were in need of a tool to close
71' Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
80 Cf Comment, Forum Non Conveniens, A New Federal Doctrine, 56 YALE
L.J. 1234, 1234 (1947) (expansion of personal jurisdiction has been countered by de-
velopment of the forum non conveniens doctrine).
" See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961), in which the court said,
Advanced means of distribution and other commercial activity have made
possible these modern methods of doing business, and have largely effaced
the economic significance of State lines. By the same token, today's facili-
ties for transportation and communication have removed much of the diffi-
culty and inconvenience formerly encountered in defending lawsuits
brought in other States.
Unless they are applied in recognition of the changes brought about
by technological and economic progress, jurisdictional concepts which may
have been reasonable enough in a simpler economy lose their relation to
reality ....
Id. at 442-43, 176 N.E.2d at 766. Accord Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51
(1958). See generally Kalo, Jurisdiction as an Evolutionary Process: The Development
of Quasi In Rem and In Personam Principles, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1147, 1162-82 (dis-
cussing the development of the corporation and its effect on American jurisdictional
principles).
82 See, e.g., R. SILVERMAN, LAW AND URBAN GROWTH: CIvIL LITIGATION IN
THE BOSTON TRIAL COURTS, 1880-1900, at 11-13 (1981).
83 See Blair, supra note 5, at 1 (citing Report of the Special Calendar Committee,
N.Y. App. Div., 1st Dep't (June 20, 1927)); cf. Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and
the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 234 n.91 (1948)
(number of civil nonbankruptcy cases in federal court almost doubled between 1940
and 1947).
84 See Blair, supra note 5, at 34 ("[Ljitigation instituted in an inappropriate fo-
rum . . . proceeds deliberately from a desire to" sue where verdicts are largest . ...
Calendars become congested, and local taxpayers suffer unjustly . . . ."); see also J.
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the courthouse doors. 5
Moreover, a number of judicial and legislative actions from 1938
through 1948 put pressure on the Court to develop a doctrine to limit
access to the federal courts. The first such development was the restric-
tion of federal common law in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins"8 in 1938.
The regime of Swift v. Tyson,17 whatever its defects, created uniformity
in the law applied in federal courts and thereby limited any incentive
for forum shopping at the federal level. While Erie limited the incen-
tive to shop between state and federal forums, it renewed the incentives
for parties to choose strategically among federal courts. Thus the fed-
eral courts had a new-found need for a procedural defense against a
flood of litigation.
The second development generating a need for the adoption of a
forum non conveniens doctrine was the expansion of personal jurisdic-
tion and the demise of Pennoyer v. Neff. In the 1946 decision in Inter-
national Shoe, the territorialist theory of jurisdiction gave way to a far
more complex amalgam of jurisdictional theories. 88 Jurisdiction was not
simply an expression of geographic boundaries; it represented a balance
of the state's regulatory interest in the conduct at issue, the relative
convenience of holding trial in the jurisdiction, the foreseeability of trial
within the jurisdiction, and the quid pro quo notion that if a defendant
availed herself of the forum's laws it was equitable to subject her to its
jurisdiction. The minimum-contacts test developed in International
Shoe was in some sense based on all of these policies.89 Because juris-
AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 48-49 (1976) (describing problems with contingent fees and ambulance chas-
ing); infra note 101 (quoting a Congressman's description of one attorney's practices).
85 Cf. Dainow, supra note 5, at 871 (commerce clause employed in 1920's as a
means of controlling "flood of imported litigation").
86 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
87 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Swift held that in matters of "general" common
law, where the state had not enacted specific statutory provisions, the federal courts
were free to decide for themselves what "the law" was, independent of what the state
courts had said. See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 17, § 54, at 347-52 (describing
the pre-Erie regime).
88 See Lilly, supra note 29, at 88-90.
s9 Three separate strands of due process-convenience, state regulatory interest,
and quid pro quo-can be discerned in three paragraphs of the opinion:
[Due process] demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation
with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our
federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend the par-
ticular suit which is brought there. An "estimate of the inconveniences"
which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its "home"
.. . is relevant in this connection.
[A]lthough the commission of some single or occasional acts of
the corporate agent in a state sufficient to impose an obligation or liability
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diction no longer depended on the physical presence of a defendant
within the jurisdiction, a number of states could assert jurisdiction over
the same controversy, particularly when a corporate defendant was in-
volved. Thus plaintiffs were given a whole new set of options to con-
sider in selecting forums.
The Court's decision in International Shoe was presaged in 1939
by the demise of limitations on the venue of suits against corporations.
In Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,90 the Court held that
corporations that consented to be sued in a state pursuant to state law
also waived their privilege under the Judiciary Act of 1875, as
amended in 1887, not to be sued except where they "resided." The
opinion of Justice Frankfurter furnished the analytic prerequisite to
International Shoe: the limitations imposed on the place of trial, in
contrast to the "power" of the court to adjudicate, represent a "privi-
lege" vested in the defendant and not a limit on the authority of the
tribunal. Thus, the "privilege" may be waived without frustrating the
congressional intent reflected in the venue statute. This analysis mirrors
the shifting of the focus in International Shoe from the public issue of
which states could assert their sovereignty without impairing the sover-
eignty of another state to the private issue of whether a defendant is
being treated fairly.91
By conceptualizing the issue of the place of trial as something pri-
on the corporation has not been thought to confer upon the state authority
to enforce it, . . other such acts, because of their nature and quality and
the circumstances of their commission, may be deemed sufficient to render
the corporation liable to suit.
[ .. T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of con-
ducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the
laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obliga-
tions, and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the
activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to
respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be
said to be undue.
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317-19 (citations omitted) (quoting Hutchinson v.
Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930)).
90 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
"' See Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoreti-
cal Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. Rv. 1112 (1981), in which Professor Redish argues
that any federalism component of personal jurisdiction must be derived from the full
faith and credit clause, not the fourteenth amendment, which is concerned with protect-
ing individual rights rather than limiting states' powers. He accordingly views Pen-
noyer as an aberration, and International Shoe as a return to a historically sounder
view of due process. See id. at 1112-21; see also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104
S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring) (state interests are not properly
part of the due process equation; the only function of the due process clause is to pro-
tect individual liberty interests); Drobak, supra note 33.
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vate to the litigants and not embracing broader political issues involving
the claims of conflicting sovereigns to adjudicate and regulate the con-
duct at issue, the Neirbo Court smoothed the way for an ad hoc and
discretionary resolution of the venue issue. However much choice of
venue might determine substantive rights, resolve the choice of law, or
implicate the public interest, only private privileges were being altered,
and the treatment of these privileges was a task properly vested in the
sound discretion of the trial court.
Both International Shoe and Neirbo heralded the development of
the forum non conveniens doctrine not only because of the forum shop-
ping they induced, but also because of the doctrinal muddle they engen-
dered. When Justice Stone acknowledged in International Shoe that
personal jurisdiction had evolved beyond a power theory into a more
complex amalgam of policies,92 the conceptual distinctions between
venue, jurisdiction, and forum non conveniens were hopelessly blurred.
While this expansive conception of jurisdiction in one sense created a
need for a further limitation on a plaintiff's choice of forum, in another
sense it made the employment of any other doctrine totally redundant.
The personal-jurisdiction doctrine now accounted for the sufficiency of
the state's interest in the controversy as well as the relative burdens on
the parties.93 The development of a second doctrine, the application of
which was vested in the sound discretion of the trial court, and which
tested for the very same factors as personal jurisdiction, necessarily di-
luted the importance of personal jurisdiction and promoted judicial tol-
erance of its vagueness, ambiguity, and excesses. If the new conception
of jurisdiction was unworkable, or resulted in anomalous applications,
it hardly mattered when everything could be straightened out with the
forum non conveniens doctrine.94
" See generally Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the
In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25
U. CHi. L. REV. 569, 577-86 (1958) (examining in personam jurisdiction over corpora-
tions before International Shoe and discerning three separate doctrines: "consent,"
"presence," and "doing business").
" Both the regulatory-interest and convenience components of International Shoe
were somewhat eclipsed in later years. The Court in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958), held unconstitutional Florida's assertion of'jurisdiction over an out-of-state
bank, despite Florida's apparent regulatory interest in settling an estate and, as Justice
Black pointed out in dissent, despite the absence of any demonstrated inconvenience of
the forum. See id. at 258-59 (Black, J., dissenting); cf. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (jurisdiction may not be asserted if the defendant has
not purposefully availed itself of the benefits of the forum, even if the litigation would
involve the forum's interest in the safety of its roads and would not be inconvenient for
the defendant).
9" Cf Abrams, supra note 61, at 47-49 (arguing that forum non conveniens
should be used to weed out those cases that pass jurisdictional tests but are "so little
affiliated with the United States that they should not be heard in the federal court
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Ironically, the third judicial development acting as a catalyst for
the development of forum non conveniens doctrine was one that ele-
vated the importance of venue. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. Kep-
ner95 involved an action under the Federal Employers Liability Act
(FELA) 6 in federa-t-ourt in a state having no connection with the
controversy other than being one of several places where the defendant
railroad was "doing business." The Court in Kepner prohibited a court
in the state where the plaintiff resided and where the cause of action
arose from enjoining the FELA action."' Instead of viewing venue as a
protection for the defendant against suit in an inconvenient loca-
tion-the conception of venue articulated by Justice Frankfurter in
Neirbo-the Court in Kepner saw venue as a legislative judgment
about where plaintiffs had the privilege of suing, and any abrogation of
that privilege would be at odds with a legislative directive: "A privilege
of venue, granted by the legislative body which created this right of
action, cannot be frustrated for reasons of convenience or expense. If it
is deemed unjust, the remedy is legislative .... "9'
Although the rationale of the Kepner decision was bottomed on
deference to legislative intent, the decision met with extreme congres-
sional disapproval. The following year, the House of Representatives
passed the Jennings Bill,99 which would have redefined venue in
FELA actions against railroads to eliminate the defendant's residence
and places of business as appropriate venues. The bill would have re-
quired instead that suit be brought either where the plaintiff resided or
where the cause of action arose.1 00 Extensive debate on the floor of the
House revealed that a number of Congressmen were disturbed by a
perceived increase in forum shopping by attorneys in the Chicago and
New York areas who were diverting business from the rural bar and
overloading the courts in the metropolitan areas.101
system").
314 U.S. 44 (1941).
45 U.S.C. §§ 51-69 (1982).
'7 Cf Miles v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 315 U.S. 698 (1942) (holding that a state court
may not enjoin a citizen from pursuing a FELA action in another state court).
11 Kepner, 314 U.S. at 54.
99 H.R. 1639, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
"0 For a general discussion of venue in FELA actions and the Jennings Bill, see
Barrett, supra note 5.
101 Congressman Jennings, sponsor of the bill, was particularly exercised by the
activities of one immigrant attorney:
One man in Chicago, Sol Andrews, Russian-born, who got a license
to practice law, has a quarter of a million dollars invested in this racket.
[ T]his man Andrews,... this Russian, has organized a side-
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Why the Jennings Bill never got through the Senate is unclear,
but it appears that its subject matter intersected with a larger project:
the codification of federal statutory law in the United States Judicial
Code. 102 Included in that codification were two provisions that would
have an important impact in development of the forum non conveniens
doctrine. First, Congress expressly responded to the Kepner case by
passing 28 U.S.C. § 1404,103 the transfer provision for federal courts.
Although the new code was not enacted until several months after the
Supreme Court's adoption of the forum non conveniens doctrine in
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,'" the transfer provision had been proposed
several years before.105 In a creative bit of retroactive legislative history,
annotations to section 1404 refer to it as a codification of the forum non
conveniens doctrine.1 6 The annotation more accurately suggests a con-
gressional purpose of overruling the Kepner decision,"07 thus making
clear to the Court that judicial adjustment of the place of trial would
not be inconsistent with the congressional intent to establish interstate
venue.
Ironically, the second relevant provision of the 1948 Code was one
kick corporation, the stockholders of which are his wife and his brother.
... Andrews would send runners out; he hired a yard foreman out
in California, and he would send his runners out to the injured man or to
the family of a deceased and they would show them a big check that he
claimed he had gotten as a recovery, and then when the person solicited
would sign a contract, in order to fence against trouble, if Andrews should
be hauled into court his runners would antedate a letter and have the
victim sign a letter reciting that they had heard of a big recovery that
Andrews had obtained for some person and they wondered if they could
induce him to take his lawsuit and do something for him.
93 CONG. REC. 9180-81 (1947).
102 See generally J. MOORE, MOORE'S JUDICIAL CODE: COMMENTARY
0.03(29), at 202-03 (1949).
o 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1982).
'o 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
105 Indeed, the proposed provision was cited as support for the court of appeals'
assertion in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1946), rev'd, 330 U.S.
501 (1947), that the remedy for inconvenient venue should be legislation rather than
judicial adoption of forum non conveniens. See 153 F.2d at 886.
106 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) annot. (1982) (Historical and Revision Notes); cf.
Currie, supra note 4, at 416.
107 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) annot. (1982) (Historical and Revision Notes):
Subsection (a) was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, permitting transfer to a more convenient forum, even
though the venue is proper. As an example of the need of such a provision,
see [Kepner], which was prosecuted under the [FELA] in New York, al-
though the accident occurred and the employee resided in Ohio. The new
subsection requires the court to determine that the transfer is necessary for
convenience of the parties and witnesses, and further, that it is in the in-
terest of justice to do so.
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that made forum shopping easier: the expansion of corporate venue
under 28 U.S.C. § 1391."08 The new provision finished the work
started by the Neirbo case and provided venue against corporate defen-
dants in any district in which they were doing business, regardless of
any formal appointment of agent as in Neirbo. This provision is an odd
counterpoint to both the Jennings Bill-which would have, in effect,
partially overruled Neirbo-and section 1404, which expressed a simi-
lar concern about the overbreadth of existing venue provisions. Legisla-
tive history sheds no light on this apparent innsi-fncy.
In one sense, however, sections--404 and 1391 are consistent.
Taken together, the two-provisions represent a legislative abdication of
control over the place of trial. The 1948 Code first expanded plaintiffs'
choice of forums, then hedged that choice by allowing the courts to
frustrate it wherever they thought it appropriate. The Code got Con-
gress out of the business of specifying the appropriate place of trial and
delegated that task to the courts.
A. Judicial Power to Dismiss Prior to 1947
The delegation from Congress of the power to dismiss unwanted
lawsuits was eagerly accepted by the courts. Judicial abstention was the
order of the day. Beginning in the midthirties, and continuing through
the late forties, the Supreme Court developed a series of doctrines that
divested the federal courts of authority to adjudicate.' In 1936, the
Court cut back on federal-question jurisdiction in Gully v. First Na-
tional Bank," 0 holding that the case did not "arise under" federal law
simply because a federal statute authorized the state law on which the
plaintiff's claim was based. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,"' decided in
1938, eliminated the general federal common law. In 1941, a series of
limiting doctrines emerged that precluded federal-court injunction of
criminal proceedings," 2 prohibited the injunction of relitigation of fed-
eral judgments in state courts," 3 and diminished federal-question juris-
diction in order to allow the state courts to answer state-law questions
that could resolve the lawsuit and obviate the need to consider federal
constitutional questions.114 Although these decisions were responses to
108 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1982).
109 See generally J. MOORE, supra note 102, 0.03(6), at 53-58.
110 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
m 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
'-- See, e.g., Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941).
11 See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941). Toucey was
expressly overruled by the 1948 revision of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1982).
114 See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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specific concerns about federalism and states' rights, they laid the
ground for a broader principle of abstention and a sensitivity to the
potential overbreadth of a court's formal jurisdiction.
In addition to the abstention doctrines motivated by federalism, the
law developed a series of corollaries to the pre-International Shoe
limitations on personal jurisdiction. The most frequently employed was
the doctrine that a court should not accept jurisdiction where it would
be forced to interfere in the internal affairs of a foreign corporation.
Under the pre-International Shoe conception of personal jurisdiction,
a corporation could not be present outside of its state of incorporation.
Thus, in theory, a court was powerless to compel action by a foreign
corporation.11 5 Surprisingly, as the fiction of corporate presence was
abandoned, and states became empowered to subject foreign corpora-
tions to their judicial authority, the noninterference doctrine was relied
on as precedent for the employment of the forum non conveniens doc-
trine.116 Yet it was the very abandonment of the narrower conception of
personal jurisdiction over corporations that necessitated the invocation
of the forum non conveniens doctrine to limit the reach of personal
jurisdiction.
Perhaps the closest pre-1948 analogues to the modern principle of
forum non conveniens were the equitable power of a court to enjoin its
own citizens from pursuing vexatious out-of-state proceedings,117 an
admiralty doctrine of forum non conveniens, n 8 and a short-lived com-
merce clause doctrine that precluded state courts from asserting juris-
diction over defendants engaged in interstate commerce when that ac-
tion would "unreasonably obstruct, and unduly burden interstate
commerce."" 9 Use of the commerce clause as an instrument to limit a
plaintiff's choice of forum was substantially curtailed within eleven
11' See generally Note, Forum Non Conveniens and the "Internal Affairs" of a
Foreign Corporation, supra note 5 (analyzing internal-affairs cases).
" See, e.g., Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 130 (1933).
117 See, e.g., Greenberg v. Greenberg, 218 A.D. 104, 218 N.Y.S. 87 (1926) ("[A]
court has the power to enjoin and restrain residents within its jurisdiction from prose-
cuting an action commenced in a foreign jurisdiction."); Gwathmey v. Gwathmey, 116
Misc. 85, 190 N.Y.S. 199 (Sup. Ct. 1921) (court has power to enjoin a husband's suit
for divorce in another state if he has not acquired the necessary residence there), affd,
201 A.D. 843, 193 N.Y.S. 935 (1922); see also Note, Injunctions Against Foreign
Suits-A Survey of the New York Policy in Interstate Matrimonial Litigation, 13
BROOKLYN L. REV. 148 (1947)(examining the injunction policy of New York courts
with respect to interstate matrimonial litigation).
118 For general descriptions of this doctrine, see Bickel, supra note 4, at 13;
Ehrenzweig, supra note 49, at 303-04.
"I Davis v. Farmers Coop. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 317 (1923). See generally
Dainow, supra note 5, at 868-72; Foster, supra note 72, at 1232-39; Comment, Con-
flict of Laws-Jurisdiction over Nonresident Carriers as Limited by Doctrine of Un-
reasonable Burden on Interstate Commerce, 34 MICH. L. REv. 979 (1936).
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years of the doctrine's adoption.12° The absence of any clear standards
for the doctrine's application yielded inconsistent results in the cases in
which it was employed. 2'
Neither of the other two precursors was appropriate authority for
a general doctrine of forum non conveniens. The admiralty device
evolved in response to the absence of any venue provisions in admi-
ralty.'22 The formal jurisdiction of the admiralty courts was intention-
ally overinclusive to assure that seamen frequently working abroad
were provided with an adequate remedy.'23 The forum non conveniens
doctrine was the only tool available to limit the jurisdiction of the
courts and was carefully molded to insure that there would be some
remedy in every case while maintaining the comity of nations whose
ships and subjects might be involved. 2  The doctrine was not designed
to assure trial in the most convenient location.
120 In International Milling Co. v. Columbia Co., 292 U.S. 511 (1934), the Su-
preme Court declared Davis v. Farmers Coop. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923), which
had been the primary authority for viewing excessive assertion of jurisdiction as viola-
tive of the commerce clause, to be "confined narrowly within the bounds of its own
facts." 292 U.S. at 517. The Court permitted Minnesota to assert jurisdiction over a
controversy between two Delaware corporations over a breach of contract occurring
outside of Minnesota. The plaintiff's principal place of business was in Minnesota, and
the defendant regularly conducted business in the state. Justice Cardozo, writing for the
Court, held that the suit "may be a burden, but oppressive and unreasonable it is not."
Id. at 521.
After International Milling, the doctrine was infrequently invoked when the de-
fendant was otherwise subject to jurisdiction, particularly when the defendant was a
resident of the forum. Compare Ketch v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 51 F. Supp. 243
(D. Tenn. 1943) (suit by a Maine resident against an out-of-state corporation that
conducted business in the forum state for injuries suffered in Georgia was not an un-
reasonable burden on interstate commerce); Wynne v. Queen City Coach Co., 49 F.
Supp. 103 (D.N.J. 1943) (New Jersey resident's suit against North Carolina defendant
for injuries sustained in Tennessee did not unduly burden interstate commerce); Karius
v. All States Freight, Inc., 176 Misc. 155, 26 N.Y.S.2d 738 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (resident's
suit based on accident in Pennsylvania against out-of-state corporation licensed to do
business in the forum was not an unreasonable burden on commerce) with Bohn v.
Norfolk & W. Ry., 22 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (resident's action against a Vir-
ginia corporation not "doing business" in the forum for injuries sustained in Virginia
violated the commerce clause); Livingston v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 18 F. Supp. 863
(N.D. Okla. 1937) (resident's suit against railroad having only a ticket agent in the
state would unduly burden commerce).
The subsequent substitution of the forum non conveniens doctrine for an approach
rooted in the commerce clause can be seen as consistent with the conceptual shift, see
supra note 37, from viewing the place of trial in terms of the relationships between
sovereigns to viewing it in terms of issues personal to the litigants.
121 See Farrier, Suits Against Foreign Corporations as a Burden on Interstate
Commerce, 17 MINN. L. REv. 381, 386-90 (1933).
122 See Bickel, supra note 4, at 16 n.24.
123 See Ehrenzweig, supra note 49, at 303-04; cf. Braucher, supra note 4, at 919
(discussing in the context of admiralty cases the federal courts' development of discre-
tionary power to decline jurisdiction).
"" See Bickel, supra note 4, at 20-22.
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The power of courts to enjoin citizens from pursuing vexatious
litigation in out-of-state forums resembled forum non conveniens in
that the courts took many of the same considerations into account and
that issuance of the injunction was vested in the broad discretion of the
trial judge.'25 However, the doctrine was the inverse of a forum non
conveniens doctrine; it was employed to protect the jurisdiction of the
court issuing the injunction against usurpation by a foreign court,"2"
not to rid the domestic court of suits that ought to have been brought
elsewhere. Again, as in the admiralty cases, the practice was not at
odds with other formal court-access doctrines.
In 1929, Paxton Blair, a Wall Street lawyer,'27 published an arti-
cle in the Columbia Law Review in which he combined these threads
under a single principle of forum non conveniens, which he described
as "the discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise a possessed
jurisdiction whenever it appears that the cause before it may be more
appropriately tried elsewhere." 2 Blair invoked the Scottish doctrine as
common-law authority for the "inherent powers possessed by every
court" to dismiss lawsuits when "necessary to the effective performance
of judicial functions."29 While acknowledging the formal absence of
the forum non conveniens doctrine in American cases, Blair argued that
the courts had in effect applied the doctrine in a number of cases by
declining to assert jurisdiction for reasons of comity, absence of remedy,
or convenience. For the first time, all of the jurisdiction-declining doc-
trines were contemplated as part of the same principle,' 30 a principle
that Blair insisted was well ingrained in Anglo-American law.
Blair's article was met with the kind of judicial reception that law
professors dream of. Four Supreme Court decisions between 1929 and
1946 defined the parameters of a forum non conveniens doctrine that
was virtually without reference prior to the Blair article.'31 All but one
125 See Note, supra note 117, at 157.
128 See Note, supra note 117, at 149.
117 See WHO's WHO IN LAw 86 (J. Schwarz ed. 1937). Blair was an associate at
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft at the time he wrote his seminal article on forum non
conveniens. See id.
128 Blair, supra note 5, at 1.
129 Id. As discussed above, see supra text accompanying notes 44-48, reliance on
Scottish precedent was of questionable propriety.
130 Cf. Barrett, supra note 5, at 388; Currie, supra note 4, at 417.
131 See Williams v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 326 U.S. 549 (1946); Rogers v. Guar-
anty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933); Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.Ss., Ltd., 285
U.S. 413 (1932); Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
These decisions removed a number of legal obstacles to the widespread adoption of
the broad forum non conveniens doctrine envisioned by Blair. See generally Barrett,
supra note 5, at 389-99 (discussing the development of the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens in the state and federal courts); Braucher, supra note 4, at 914-22 (analyzing
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cited Blair.1"2 By 1941, Justice Frankfurter was referring to "the fa-
miliar doctrine of forum non conveniens," which was "firmly imbed-
ded in our law."' 133
B. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert: Federal Adoption of the Forum Non
Conveniens Doctrine
The forum non conveniens doctrine increased in popularity in the
decade following the Blair article, but full-fledged acceptance by federal
courts did not come until 1947, with the Supreme Court's decisions in
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert'3 4 and Koster v. (American) Lumbermens
the state and federal limitations on courts' discretionary power to dismiss actions). The
first was the argument that dismissing the claims of foreign plaintiffs represented an
impermissible form of discrimination under either the full faith and credit clause or the
privileges and immunities clause. The Court disposed of this problem in Douglas, rea-
soning that it was permissible to favor domestic plaintiffs because they paid for the
operation of the courts in the forum state. Moreover, any discrimination was not per se
against noncitizens, but rather against nonresidents. See Douglas, 279 U.S. at 387.
The second obstacle was the principle established in Kepner: that the legislature's
provision of venue and jurisdiction in a given forum imposed a duty upon the court to
exercise that jurisdiction. See Kepner, 314 U.S. at 44. In declining the exercise of its
formal jurisdiction, a court was denying the plaintiff a right and abdicating its respon-
sibility: "[T]he courts of the United States are bound to proceed to judgment, and to
afford redress to suitors before them, in every case to which their jurisdiction extends.
They cannot abdicate their authority or duty in any case in favor of another jurisdic-
tion." Hyde v. Stone, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 170, 175 (1857). Removal of this obstacle was
a gradual process. In Canada Malting v. Paterson S.Ss., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932), the
Court created an exception to the rule stated in Hyde for admiralty disputes between
foreign parties. Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, reasoned that a court's admi-
ralty jurisdiction was by its very nature discretionary. See id. at 422-23 (citing Blair,
supra note 5). He then opened the door for a more expansive power of dismissal by
baldly asserting that "[o]bviously, the proposition that a court having jurisdiction must
exercise it, is not universally true." Id. at 422.
This assertion was picked up the following year by Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co.,
288 U.S. 123 (1933), in which the Court authorized dismissal on the grounds that a
court could not be asked to interfere with the internal affairs of a foreign corporation.
Such dismissals had been authorized in the past, but on the grounds that a court was
without power to compel specific performance by an out-of-state corporation. See Note,
Forum Non Conveniens and the "Internal Affairs" of a Foreign Corporation, supra
note 5, at 493-94. The Rogers Court expanded the rationale for dismissal, holding that
a court could consider "convenience, efficiency and justice" in determining whether to
retain jurisdiction in "internal affairs" cases. See Rogers, 288 U.S. at 131. In Williams
v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 326 U.S. 549 (1946), the Court stated in dictum that the rule
in Rogers was not limited to "internal affairs" cases, but could be used as an "instru-
ment of justice" in any case in which it could be shown that the plaintiff's choice of
forum was "vexatious or oppressive." Id. at 554-57.
132 See Williams v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 326 U.S. 549, 555 n.4 (1946); Canada
Malting Co. v. Paterson S.Ss., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 423 n.6 (1932); Douglas v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377, 382 (1929) (describing argument for
respondent).
133 Kepner, 314 U.S. at 55-56 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
13 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
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Mutual Casualty Co. 11 5 The decisions in those cases were far from
predetermined.
In Gulf Oil, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed a New York district court's dismissal of an action.
brought by the owner of a warehouse in Virginia."3 6 The plaintiff al-
leged that the warehouse was damaged by a fire caused by the defen-
dant's negligent delivery of gasoline. The court determined that, as in
Kepner, the legislature had bestowed a "privilege" on the plaintiff in
enacting jurisdiction and venue rules that permitted suit to be brought
in New York, and the courts had no business abrogating that privi-
lege.13 7 The Supreme Court reversed.
While Justice Black, in dissent, was troubled by the apparent
frustration of legislative purpose inherent in the forum non conveniens
doctrine,13 the majority all but ignored the issue and sanctioned the
forum non conveniens dismissal' 38 In a retreat from both Neirbo and
Kepner,40 Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, announced that
the existence of proper jurisdiction and venue141 does not vest the plain-
tiff with a privilege to sue in the forum but merely permits the court to
entertain the action if otherwise appropriate. 4 Relying on a particu-
larly formalized distinction, Justice Jackson reasoned that jurisdiction
over "the person" merely subjects a party to the court's power to apply
the applicable law, which includes the power to dismiss a proceeding
on forum non conveniens grounds.
1 43
While this tenuous reasoning was virtually ignored in subsequent
cases, the Court's definition of the broad parameters of the doctrine,
encompassing every conceivably relevant public and private considera-
tion, became a litany that would be quoted in many subsequent federal
and state forum non conveniens decisions:
Wisely, it has not been attempted to catalogue the cir-
cumstances which will justify or require either grant or de-
nial of remedy. The doctrine leaves much to the discretion of
135 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
8 See Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 153 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1946), rev'd, 330 U.S.
501 (1947).
137 See id. at 885.
See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 515 (Black, J., dissenting).
139 See id. at 507-09.
140 The Court distinguished the holding in Kepner by characterizing the venue
statute there as a "special" manifestation of congressional intent to vest in plaintiffs an
unequivocal right to bring suit in specified forums. See id. at 505-06.
141 In fact, venue in Gulf Oil was apparently improper, but the objection was
waived by the defendant. See Braucher, supra note 4, at 927.
141 See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 506-07.
143 See id.
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the court to which plaintiff resorts, and experience has not
shown a judicial tendency to renounce one's own jurisdiction
so strong as to result in many abuses.
If the combination and weight of factors requisite to
given results are difficult to forecast or state, those to be con-
sidered are not difficult to name. An interest to be consid-
ered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the private
interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the rela-
tive ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compul-
sory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of ob-
taining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expe-
ditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to
the enforceability of judgment if one is obtained. The court
will weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial. It is
often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconve-
nient forum, "vex," "harass," or "oppress" the defendant by
inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to his
own right to pursue his remedy. But unless the balance is
strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of
forum should rarely be disturbed.
Factors of public interest also have place in applying
the doctrine. Administrative difficulties follow for courts
when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of
being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought
not to be imposed upon the people of a community which
has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch the
affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial
in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the
country where they can learn of it by report only. There is a
local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home. There is an appropriateness, too, in-having the trial of
a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law
that must govern the case, rather than having a court in
some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and
in law foreign to itself.1
4 4
A number of points call for comment. First is the Court's conclu-
sion that it "wisely" did not attempt to articulate more precise guide-
lines and that application of the amorphous doctrine must be left to the
14" Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508-09 (footnotes omitted).
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discretion of the trial court. With that remarkable assumption, the
Court delegated to trial courts the judgment about when, how, and why
a case should be dismissed or retained, and insulated that judgment
from effective appellate review. The Court offered no further explana-
tion why more specific guidance was not feasible or why full appellate
review was inappropriate. While it is tempting to attribute those rules
to a judgment that dismissal decisions are inherently fact-dependent,
the public factors enumerated by the Court would seem primarily to
involve legal questions about which jurisdiction has the most significant
relation to the controversy, questions well within the competency of ap-
pellate courts. 45 Moreover, even to the extent that the forum non con-
veniens issue turned on facts, the trial court's decision in Gulf Oil was
based on the paper record of affidavits, pleadings, and briefs14 6 typical
in forum non conveniens cases and thus would have been amenable to
appellate review.1
4 7
A more persuasive explanation for the extraordinary deference
given to trial courts was suggested by Justice Black in dissent: to the
extent that any precedent existed for a general doctrine of forum non
conveniens, the majority relied on the equity doctrine permitting dis-
missal when a court would be required to interfere in the internal af-
145 Although that issue was not prominent in Gulf Oil, a substantial percentage of
subsequent forum non conveniens decisions have turned on such an informal "interest
analysis." See, e.g., Lake v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 262, 274 (N.D.
Ohio 1982) (Ohio has the greatest governmental interest in regulating the conduct of an
Ohio pharmaceutical manufacturer whose decision in Ohio regarding Canadian distri-
bution allegedly injured a Canadian citizen), motion for dismissal denied sub nom.
Haddad v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1158 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Harrison
v. Wyeth Laboratories, 510 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (United Kingdom has the
paramount interest in regulating distribution and labeling of pharmaceuticals in that
country), affd, 676 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1982); Michell v. General Motors Corp., 439 F.
Supp. 24, 26 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (Canada has greatest interest in hearing claim brought
by Canadian resident against American manufacturer of defective car seat); Noto v. Cia
Secula di Armanento, 310 F. Supp. 639, 647-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (New York has no
interest in dispute between Dutch and Italian parties arising in Iranian port); Islamic
Republic v. Pahlavi, 94 A.D.2d 374, 377-79, 464 N.Y.S.2d 487, 490-91 (1983) (New
York has no interest in adjudicating dispute between the people of Iran and the former
Shah; Iran has the paramount interest).
146 See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 509-10.
147 See SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1311 (6th Cir. 1974); Dempster Bros., Inc.
v. Buffalo Metal Container Corp., 352 F.2d 420, 423 (2d Cir. 1965); United States ex
rel. Binion v. O'Brien, 273 F.2d 495, 497 (3d Cir. 1959); Chas. D. Briddell, Inc. v.
Alglobe Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 416, 420 (2d Cir. 1952); see also Bowles v. Beatrice
Creamery Co., 146 F.2d 774, 780 (10th Cir. 1944) (clearly erroneous standard of re-
view inappropriate when lower court made factual determinations on the basis of affi-
davits and pleadings; appellate court equally capable of examining evidence and draw-
ing conclusions from it). See generally 5A J. MOORE & J. LucAs, MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE, 52.04 (2d ed. 1984) (describing the effect of findings with respect to docu-
mentary evidence, uncontradicted testimony, and evidence by deposition).
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fairs of a foreign corporation. In equity, the discretionary nature of the
court's jurisdiction was part and parcel of the very notion of the court's
power; there was no vested entitlement to equitable relief.14 This pre-
cedent was inapposite authority for discretionary jurisdiction in courts
of law, however, and provided inappropriate support for the standard
of review established by the Gulf Oil Court.149
Another key-and equally questionable-premise of the majority's
position was the notion that, "unless the balance is strongly in favor of
the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be dis-
turbed. '150 While this presumption in favor of a plaintiffs choice of
forum apparently was fairly well established, it does not seem histori-
cally to have been based on any deliberate policy decision to bestow
significant forum-shopping advantages on plaintiffs. Indeed, at common
law, just the opposite principle, that suit must be brought where the
plaintiff finds the defendant, was enshrined in a Latin maxim: actor
sequitur forum rei.151 Moreover, the "evil" of forum shopping was a
central focus of the Court's decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,
decided just nine years earlier.
Although the origins of the presumption cited by the Court are
unclear, the process of historical accident again seems to be a plausible
explanation. In an era in which conceptions of a court's personal juris-
diction were narrow-limited to immediate presence of the defendant's
person or property-a rule that gave deference to the plaintiffs
"choice" of forum was a modest bequest. The "choice" was in reality a
burden of traveling to the defendant's home forum. When the scope of
personal jurisdiction was subsequently expanded so that a defendant
became subject to suit in numerous jurisdictions, a rule that once oper-
ated at a practical level to the disadvantage of plaintiffs eventually
152
148 See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 514 (Black, J., dissenting); accord, Braucher, supra
note 4, at 925.
"" In fact, in the Scottish decision cited by the Court in support of the existence of
a power to dismiss for forum non conveniens, Logan v. Bank of Scot., [1"906] 1 K.B.
141, there is no mention of an abuse-of-discretion standard, and the court in Logan
seems to engage in a de novo review of the lower court's findings. See id. at 153-54; see
also Clements v. Macaulay, 1866 Sess. Cas. M. 583, 593-94 (delineating the factors
that might influence a court to exercise its discretion and dismiss on "forum non com-
petens" grounds despite proper jurisdiction). Note, however, that Professor Dainow,
writing twelve years before the Gulf Oil decision, urged the adoption of a discretionary
standard, citing British and Scottish practice in support. See Dainow, supra note 5, at
870.
150 Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508; see also J. GOULD, supra note 54, at 12; Dainow,
supra note 5, at 883 (discussing the British rule that a plaintiff's choice of forum
should not be disturbed unless it is found to be "vexatious").
151 See A. GiBB, supra note 46, at 28.
'5' It should be noted that the full forum-shopping impact of the presumption in
favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum was not felt until some time after Gulf Oil was
[Vol. 133:781
FORUM NON CONVENIENS
gave them enormous control over both choice of forum and choice of
law.
158
It is possible to make arguments for preferring the plaintiff's
choice of forum."' The Court might have felt that the injured party
should have easy access to judicial redress or that, in general, defen-
dants have better resources to litigate in any given forum than plain-
tiffs. However, the Court gave no indication that the preference for the
plaintiff's choice of forum was based on any rational policy choice. In
giving trial courts the discretion to dismiss the proceeding, the Gulf Oil
Court indicated that there were limits on the preference for plaintiffs'
choices. But in failing to articulate either the reasons behind the prefer-
ence, or the limits on its use, the Court left the law in a state of confu-
sion. Trial courts were instructed to defer to a plaintiff's choice of fo-
rum, except when for unspecified reasons they should not. "55 Moreover,
the trial court's resolution of the issue was placed beyond effective re-
view; further appellate clarification was virtually foreclosed. Indeed, the
Supreme Court did not speak on the matter for another thirty-five
years.
156
decided. At the time of the Gulf Oil decision, the lex loci approach was dominant in the
conflicts-of-laws doctrine throughout the country. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
U.S. 302, 308 n.1l (1981); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLicr OF LAWS §§
332, 378 (1934). Thus, a plaintiff had only a limited advantage in being able to choose
one forum over another because, in either one, the same substantive law would govern
the controversy. This uniformity broke down with the advent of "interest analysis" in
the 1950's; some states rejected interest analysis as a conflicts tool, and states that
adopted it differed as to how to weigh the respective state interests. See A.
EHRENZWEIG, supra note 55, § 104. This allowed a plaintiff to manipulate the appli-
cable law through choice of forum. That power was enhanced as more states moved
toward a lexfori approach. See generally Korn, supra note 6, at 776, 789-91 (discuss-
ing a trend to abandon or modify the once universally accepted rule of lex loci delicti,
which refers all conflicts with respect to substantive issues in a tort case to the law of
the place of injury, and to adopt "flexible modern approaches").
153 If, as a number of commentators have suggested, it is myopic for a court to
consider only fairness to a defendant in evaluating the constitutional propriety of its
jurisdiction, see, e.g., Lewis, The "Forum State Interest" Factor in Personal Jurisdic-
tion Adjudication: Home-Court Horses Hauling Constitutional Carts, 33 MancaE L.
REv. 769, 816-17 & n.269 (1982); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 41, at 1127-
28, that myopia can be traced, at least in part, to the curious presumption that the
plaintiff may choose freely from a range of potential forums. Once the defendant is thus
placed at the plaintiff's mercy, limiting the number of potential forums through consid-
eration of "fairness" to the defendant becomes the only way to even up the score.
15 See, e.g., Seidelson, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts Hearing Federal Cases:
An Examination of the Propriety of the Limitations Imposed by Venue Restrictions, 37
GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 82, 85-86 (1968) (presumption in limine that the plaintiff has
been wronged by the defendant justifies inconveniencing the defendant rather than the
plaintiff).
185 See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 506-08.
a The Court next addressed the doctrine of forum non conveniens in Piper Air-
craft Corp. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). See infra text accompanying notes 176-213.
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The last element of the Gulf Oil decision requiring scrutiny is the
enumeration of the factors to be balanced by the trial court in deciding
whether to dismiss a proceeding. The dual focus on private and public
factors subsumes, in different language, the very same considerations
the Court thought were relevant in determining whether jurisdiction
was permissible under the minimum-contacts test of International
Shoe: whether assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant would be in-
convenient and whether the nature of the cause of action alleged is such
that the state has an interest that justifies its assertion of jurisdiction.157
In directing trial courts to consider whether the litigation is being
"handled at its origin," whether the litigation bears a sufficient "rela-
tion" to the "community" to justify the "burden" being imposed,
whether the case "touch[es] the affairs" of the community, and whether
the case is "a localized controvers[y]" that ought to be "decided at
home,"1 ' the Court in effect delegated to trial courts substantive deci-
sions about the allocation of judicial power. Such an inquiry necessarily
requires trial courts to evaluate the forum's and the alternative forums'
governmental stakes in the controversy and to make crucial choice-of-
law determinations.159 This has resulted in numerous forum non con-
veniens decisions turning, not on a balance of conveniences, but on an
informal "interest analysis" that would have done Brainerd Currie
proud.
By basing jurisdictional decisions on an analysis of the relative
strengths of the various possible forums' interests in the controversy, the
167 Although the latter consideration was not stated as such in International Shoe,
it is the logical corollary of the Court's holding that even the commission of "single or
occasional acts" can be sufficient to support personal jurisdiction "because of their na-
ture and quality and the circumstances of their commission." International Shoe, 326
U.S. at 318. This could only mean that a state has a stronger claim to asserting juris-
diction where its regulatory interests have been implicated by the commission of tor-
tious acts within its boundaries.
158 Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508-09.
159 See, e.g., Dowling v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 727 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1984);
Esfahani v. Citibank, 587 F. Supp. 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Cruz v. Maritime Co., 549
F. Supp. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 702 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1983); Lake v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ohio 1982), motion for dismissal denied sub
nom. Haddad v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1158 (N.D. Ohio 1984);
Great N. Ry. v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App.3d 105, 90 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1970). The
choice-of-law determination implicates two related considerations under the Gulf Oil
decision. First, as the Court noted in Gulf Oil, the burden of applying foreign law adds
to the inconvenience of trial in the forum. See 330 U.S. at 509. Second, many courts
view the fact that the forum's choice-of-law rules direct them to apply foreign rather
than local law as some indication that the foreign forum has the paramount interest in
resolving the controversy. See, e.g., Lake v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 538 F. Supp.
262, 272-74 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (applicability of Ohio law indicates Ohio interest in
retaining jurisdiction), motion for dismissal denied sub nom. Haddad v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 588 F. Supp 1158 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
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Court in effect subjected these decisions to a level of federal scrutiny
that it has refused to apply to choice-of-law rules.180 Many commenta-
tors have argued that choice-of-law decisions should be subjected to the
same level of scrutiny that is exercised over personal-jurisdiction deci-
sions. 161 The objection frequently voiced is that if "fairness" is the ob-
ject of the fourteenth amendment, choice-of-law rulings should also be
subjected to the requirement that minimum contacts exist between the
controversy and the forum state."6 2 Deciding which substantive law will
be applied in an action, the argument continues, has at least as great an
impact on the parties as the location of trial."' 3 By refusing to scruti-
nize a forum's decision that its own law should control in a given
case,"' the Court tolerates greater injustice than would be inflicted by
permitting excessive assertions of personal jurisdiction.
At least in the case of federal courts sitting in diversity, the cri-
tique fails to take adequate account of the operation of forum non con-
veniens.165 While not couched in constitutional terms, limits on paro-
chial choice-of-law rules can be, and in fact are, imposed by the
decision of the federal court not to accept jurisdiction in the first place.
Thus a federal district court faced with the.prospect of trial of a foreign
cause of action need not accept the forum state's choice-of-law rules. It
160 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981) (plurality opinion)
(concluding that, so long as the forum state has some "significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts ... with the parties and the occurrence," application of forum
law does not violate the due process clause).
161 See, e.g., Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L.
REv. 872, 873 (1980); Silberman, supra note 12 at 116; Trautman & von Mehren,
Constitutional Control of Choice of Law: Reflections on Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv.
35, 45 (1981).
162 It should be noted, however, that in the analysis urged by these commentators
any contacts between a defendant and the forum state may be taken into account when
determining whether sufficient "minimum contacts" exist to support assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction, but only contacts related to the subject matter of the lawsuit could be
relied upon to establish contacts sufficient to support application of forum law. See,
e.g., Martin, supra note 161, at 872 & n.1.
163 See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 46, at 88 ("To believe that a defendant's con-
tacts with the forum state should be stronger under the due process clause for jurisdic-
tional purposes than for choice of law is to believe that an accused is more concerned
with where he will be hanged than whether.").
16 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320 (1981) (plurality opinion)
(determining that Minnesota's choice-of-law statute does not violate the due process
clause).
165 It is interesting to note that in Allstate the state supreme court declined to use
forum non conveniens to avoid applying forum law. The defendant's initial attempt to
circumvent the application of Minnesota law at trial was a motion to dismiss on forum
non conveniens grounds. The lower court held that the choice-of-law issue was not an
appropriate reason to dismiss. See Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 46
(Minn. 1978) ("The mere fact that Wisconsin law may be different from Minnesota
law is not sufficient reason to decline jurisdiction."), affd, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
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can instead determine that the alternative forum has the paramount
interest in resolution of the lawsuit and dismiss the case.
While criticism of the inadequate scrutiny of choice-of-law deci-
sions may be well founded, the use of the forum non conveniens doc-
trine to ameliorate the problem is inappropriate on a number of
grounds.1 6 First, there may be considerable tension between this ap-
proach and the holding in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.167 The Supreme
Court has dodged the question whether state or federal law governs
forum non conveniens motions every time the question has been raised,
usually on the grounds that the state and federal doctrines in the cases
before it are functionally identical. 68 If the forum non conveniens doc-
trine is in fact a vehicle for making substantive decisions about predom-
inant governmental interests, and both the intent and effect of those
decisions is to override state choice-of-law rules, then state law ought to
govern whether dismissal is appropriate; under any interpretation of
Erie, this is a "substantive" decision. 6 The effects of a federal doctrine
of forum non conveniens in a given case could well be to encourage
choice of a state forum rather than a federal forum and to create "ineq-
uitable administration of laws," the prohibition of which constituted the
"twin aims of the Erie rule.'1 7 0 For this very reason the Court held in
I6' Use of an interest analysis in forum non conveniens decisions is also subject to
the cogent criticisms voiced against that technique in the choice-of-laws context. Interest
analysis has been found unsatisfactory because of the difficulty of accurately identifying
governmental interests, see Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative
Intent, 78 U. MICH. L. REv. 392, 399-402 (1980); the impossibility of resolving con-
flicts between interested jurisdictions in any rational way, see Ely, Choice of Law and
the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173, 176 (1981);
Hill, Governmental Interests and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie,
27 U. CHT. L. REv. 463, 473-81 (1960); Korn, supra note 6, at 833-36; and the ques-
tionable constitutionality of distinguishing between parties on the basis of a state's pref-
erence for its own citizens, see Ely, supra.
16' 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
168 See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n.13 (1981); Gulf
Oil, 330 U.S. at 503.
16" Indeed, in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941),
and again in Day & Zimmermann v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975), the Supreme
Court held that, under Erie, state choice-of-law rules must be applied in a diversity
action in federal court. For similar reasons, Brainerd Currie concluded in 1955 that,
when federal courts sitting in diversity transfer cases pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),
the state law of the transferor court should, in all but unusual circumstances, be con-
trolling as a matter of federal common law. See Currie, supra note 4, at 455-65. Other-
wise, he noted, the ability to decline jurisdiction would carry with it the right to select
the applicable law. See Currie, supra note 4, at 455-56. Currie subsequently retracted
this position, however, concluding that it was appropriate for federal district courts
sitting in diversity to develop a federal common law of conflicts. See Currie, Change of
Venue and the Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. Cm. L. REV. 341, 343-44
(1960). Nonetheless, his first-announced approach was adopted by the Supreme Court
in Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964).
170 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
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Van Dusen v. Barrack"1 that, in a transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a),1"2 the law of the state in which the transferor court sits in
diversity must govern the proceedings in the transferee court:
[W]e should ensure that the "accident" of federal diversity
jurisdiction does not enable a party to utilize a transfer to
achieve a result in federal court which could not have been
achieved in the courts of the State where the action was filed.
This purpose would be defeated in cases such as the present
if nonresident defendants, properly subjected to suit in the
transferor State . . . , could invoke § 1404(a) to gain the
benefits of the laws of another jurisdiction . .. .
Since the effect, if not the intent, of a forum non conveniens dis-
missal is often to alter the applicable substantive law, it would be in-
consistent with Van Dusen to allow a federal diversity court to dismiss
a case that a state court, acting under state law, would retain. If the
Court is unwilling to allow direct circumvention of state choice-of-law
decisions through transfer tactics, it should not permit their indirect
circumvention through application of a federal law of forum non con-
veniens. A diversity court should therefore be required to apply the
forum non conveniens law of the state in which it sits.1 "
More importantly, to the extent that the evaluation of public fac-
171 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
172 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982).
173 Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 638. The Court also held that such a result would be
inconsistent with the legislative intent behind the statute. See id. at 636.
174 The converse argument could be made: if forum non conveniens doctrine is to
be used to allow federal courts to circumvent application of the forum's choice of laws
and substantive law when they feel another forum has a stronger interest in a contro-
versy because of some perceived federal interest in mediating between the jurisdictional
claims of competing sovereigns, that federal interest should carry equal weight in state
courts. A reasonable case could be made for the adoption of a federal common law in
this area. International forum non conveniens dismissals implicate the same kind of
concerns about intersovereign comity that the Court found relevant in developing the
act-of-state doctrine. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
408-09 (1964) (the plaintiff, an instrumentality of the Cuban government, was permit-
ted to sue in federal court based on principles of comity); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250, 254 (1897) (upholding conclusion that, "the acts of the defendant were the
acts of the government of Venezuela [in Venezuela], and as such [were] not properly
the subject of adjudication in the courts of another government"); Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 616 (9th Cir. 1976) (district court dismissal of case
in which the defendant had strong ties to the Honduran government upheld on forum
non conveniens ground); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (providing
situation in which acts of foreign states will not be "examined" by a jurisdiction despite
its ability to exercise such control); Martin, Constitutional Limits on Choice of Law, 61
CORNELL L. REV. 185, 196-200 (1976) (federal limits on choice of law in an interna-
tional context may be derived from interest in international comity).
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tors under Gulf Oil does constitute a substantive judgment about the
extent of the respective forums' stakes in the controversy, that judgment
should be formalized and subjected to full appellate review, whether as
a matter of state or federal law. It is antithetical to fundamental tenets
of legal process to treat similar cases differently,1 7 and that is the inev-
itable result of the procedural treatment of forum non conveniens mo-
tions. As demonstrated in Part III, it is also in fact what has happened.
C. Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Reyno-Expansion of the Doctrine
The final stage in the evolution of the doctrine came in 1981 with
the Supreme Court's decision in Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Reyno.
1 76
Reyno was the Court's first word on the subject since Gulf Oil. In some
ways, the case represents the culmination of thirty-four years of judicial
dependence on the forum non conveniens doctrine to cure inadequacies
in other procedural doctrines. The Court in Reyno formally acknowl-
edged that the forum non conveniens doctrine could be used to dismiss
actions from federal courts even when dismissal would relegate the
plaintiff to a forum with laws less hospitable to her cause of action.
1 7
Thus, even though there were sufficient minimum contacts with the
defendant to support jurisdiction and sufficient state contacts with the
controversy to justify application of the forum's law, the trial court
could nevertheless decline to assert jurisdiction over the case if, after
weighing the Gulf Oil factors, it viewed retention of jurisdiction as
"inappropriate."
Reyno involved an air crash in Scotland. The six-passenger plane
and allegedly defective propeller were manufactured in the United
States: the plane in Pennsylvania and the propeller in Ohio. At the
time of the crash, the plane was owned and operated by a small Scot-
tish airline. There were no eyewitnesses, but subsequent investigation
by Scottish authorities indicated that pilot error and improper mainte-
nance were probable causes of the accident.
17 8
The action was originally brought in a California state court by
the secretary of the plaintiffs' counsel as representative of the victims of
the crash, all of whom were Scottish. The plaintiffs asserted negligence
and strict-liability claims against the American manufacturers. The
'75 See Friendly, supra note 4, at 758 n.32 (" 'It will not do to decide the same
question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between an-
other.' ") (quoting B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 33 (1921)).
176 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
17 See id. at 254.
178 See id. at 239.
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Scottish airline and pilot were not named as defendants.""
The forum non conveniens motion was the third successful
change-of-venue measure taken by the defendants: the case was first
removed to federal court, then transferred to a Pennsylvania district
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), 80 and finally dismissed in favor
of a Scottish forum pursuant to a forum non conveniens motion. The
trial court found that the plaintiffs' choice of forum was not entitled to
the normal degree of deference because of the flagrant forum shopping
by "foreign citizens seek[ing] to benefit from the more liberal tort rules
provided for the protection of citizens and residents of the United
States."181 Applying the Gulf Oil factors, it then determined that both
the private and public factors weighed in favor of dismissal: most of the
relevant evidence was located in Scotland; only there could all of the
defendants be joined; and finally, although Pennsylvania law would
have controlled the issue of the manufacturer's liability, Scotland had
"a very strong interest in [the] litigation."18 2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed
on the grounds that the trial court had misapplied the Gulf Oil stan-
dards 3 and that dismissal would have resulted in a change in the gov-
erning substantive law to the detriment of the plaintiffs,"" strict liabil-
ity being unavailable to the plaintiffs in Scotland. The court specifically
found that under both California and Pennsylvania conflicts law the
states in which the aircraft was manufactured had the paramount inter-
est in the dispute, and that the public interest factor also weighed in
favor of trial in the United States.' 5
Reyno thus brought into sharp focus each of the three questions
implicated by Gulf Oil: Why should the plaintiff's choice of forum be
entitled to any deference? Why should dismissal be within the discre-
tion of the trial court? And why should a court be able to circumvent
the dictates of jurisdictional and choice-of-law rules through a forum
non conveniens dismissal? The Court thus had an excellent opportunity
to rework the set of dubious assumptions that had given rise to the
doctrine. It was an opportunity lost.
179 A separate action against the pilot and airline was commenced in Scotland. See
id. at 240.
180 See id. at 240-41. Defendant Hartzell Corporation, manufacturer of the pro-
peller, was not subject to personal jurisdiction in California. See id. at 240 n.5.
181 Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 479 F. Supp. 727, 731 (M.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd,
630 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), quoted in 454 U.S. at 242.
182 Id., quoted in 454 U.S. at 260.
183 See Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 161, 163 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd,
454 U.S. 235 (1981).
184 See id. at 170-71.
185 See id. at 168, 170-71.
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In sustaining the district court's dismissal, the Court relied heavily
on both the public-interest factors and the deference accorded trial
courts' decisions. After stating that "the central purpose of any forum
non conveniens inquiry is to insure that the trial is convenient," '88 the
Court went on to acknowledge that, "[plarticularly with respect to the
question of relative ease of access to sources of proof, the private inter-
ests point in both directions. 1 8 7 That acknowledgement brought two of
the three questions into play. After finding the conveniences in rela-
tively equal balance, 88 the Court could reverse the court of appeals
only by relying on the public-interest factors and the deferential stan-
dard of review to be accorded the district court's decision.
189
Despite the fact that the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
found Pennsylvania and Ohio law to be applicable to the liability issue
under conflict-of-laws principles that require various forms of interest
analysis,' 90 the Supreme Court sustained the trial court's dismissal be-
cause "Scotland has a very strong interest in this litigation"'' and be-
cause "[tihe American interest in this accident is simply not sufficient to
justify the enormous commitment of judicial time and resources that
would inevitably be required if the case were to be tried here."' 92 The
Court made this determination while assuming arguendo the correct-
ness of the court of appeals' conflicts analysis.'93 The Court held, in
188 Reyno, 454 U.S. at 256.
187 Id. at 257.
188 See id. at 257. The Court did find, however, that "the District Court did not
act unreasonably in concluding that fewer evidentiary problems would be posed if the
trial were held in Scotland." Id. at 257-58.
18I Cf Friendly, supra note 4, at 752-53 ("This was not the ordinary case of the
inconvenient forum where [a] dominant consideration[ ] [is] the counting of the noses of
witnesses . . . . [Tihe real fight in Piper had become centered on the issue whether
plaintiff was to have the benefit of rules of strict liability."). I take issue only with
Judge Friendly's implication that "ordinary" forum non conveniens decisions are less
concerned with the choice of the applicable law than was Reyno. See supra text accom-
panying notes 156-61.
180 See Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 168, 170-71 (3d. Cir. 1980),
rev'd, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). Both Pennsylvania and California have adopted a "govern-
mental interests" approach to conflicts questions, in which the courts examine whether
the policies behind the applicable state law would be impaired by the application of
another state's law. See id. at 166, 169; Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727,
63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
In fact, in California the factors that the courts consider in determining whether to
apply their own state's law are essentially the same as those they consider in determin-
ing whether the case should be dismissed under the forum non conveniens doctrine. Cf
International Harvester Co. v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. App. 3d 652, 660, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 324, 328 (1979) (California has "substantial interest" in retaining action to ad-
vance policies behind its substantive law).
181 Reyno, 454 U.S. at 260.
192 Id. at 261.
18" See id. at 260.
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other words, that even if Pennsylvania asserts a paramount interest in
applying its law to this controversy, that does not preclude a federal
trial court from dismissing the case if it believes that Scotland has the
paramount interest in adjudicating the controversy.
The Court avoided confronting this conflict directly by considering
the American interest in the litigation rather than the Pennsylvanian
interest that the court of appeals had found paramount for choice-of-
law purposes."" This approach, however, made clear the Court's con-
clusion that the interests expressed in Pennsylvania's conflicts law were
not binding on the trial court for forum non conveniens purposes.
Despite the fact that certiorari was granted specifically to consider
whether dismissal was appropriate when the forum would apply its
own law and the alternative forum would not, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized no tension between the choice-of-law and choice-of-forum de-
terminations. 195 The Court limited its consideration of the question to
the clearly correct observation that forum non conveniens doctrine
would be emasculated if courts were prohibited from using it whenever
laws less favorable to the plaintiff would be applied. As the Court
noted, a plaintiff will rarely have selected a forum other than the one
with the laws most favorable to her case.196 Therefore, if courts were
precluded from dismissing a case whenever a resulting change of law
would disfavor the plaintiff, dismissal would rarely be an available op-
tion, and the courts would be powerless to check forum shopping by
plaintiffs.
The lower courts had split over whether Gulf Oil's requirement
that there be an "adequate alternative forum" with jurisdiction over the
case1 97 meant that a forum non conveniens dismissal was foreclosed
whenever a plaintiff would be relatively disadvantaged by the applica-
tion of foreign law in the alternative forum. 98 If not, forum non con-
'" See id. at 260-61.
199 The Court granted certiorari to consider the following questions: (1)
"[w]hether, in an action in federal district court brought by foreign plaintiffs against
American defendants, the plaintiffs may defeat a motion to dismiss on the ground of
forum non conveniens merely by showing that the substantive law that would be ap-
plied if the case were litigated in the district court is more favorable to them than the
law that would be applied by the courts of their own nation"; and (2) "whether a
motion to dismiss on grounds offorum non conveniens [should] be denied whenever the
law of the alternate forum is less favorable to recovery than that which would be ap-
plied by the district court." Reyno, 454 U.S. at 246 n.12.
198 See id. at 250.
197 See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 506-07.
198 The issue of when an alternative forum was to be considered "inadequate"
had been divided into two separate issues: inadequacy due to "deficiencies" in the fo-
rum's substantive law; and inadequacy of trial procedures, such as discovery, contingent
fee arrangements, and the right to a jury trial. The United States Court of Appeals for
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veniens could be made available to defendants for what some courts had
called "reverse forum shopping."""9 The Reyno Court concluded that,
the Third Circuit was apparently alone in holding that dismissal may not be granted if
the alternative forum would apply a substantive law less favorable to the plaintiff's
claim than the forum would. Compare Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 164
(3d Cir. 1980) (fact that alternative forum would apply less favorable law bars dismis-
sal), rev'd, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) and De Mateos v. Texaco, 562 F.2d 895, 899 (3d Cir.
1977) (a forum non conveniens dismissal, like a venue transfer, should not result in a
change in the applicable law), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978) with Pain v. United
Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 794-95 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (difference in amount of
recovery available in alternative forum is not a factor relevant to forum non conveniens
inquiry), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981); Fitzgerald v. Texaco, 521 F.2d 448, 453
(2d Cir. 1975) (district court can dismiss under forum non conveniens even if alterna-
tive forum's law is less favorable to plaintiff), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976); and
Anastasiadis v. Steamship Little John, 346 F.2d 281, 283 (5th Cir. 1965) (district court
did not abuse its discretion in declining jurisdiction when there was no suggestion in
the record that Greece was an inconvenient forum or that Greek law provided an inad-
equate remedy), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 930 (1966).
Findings of procedural inadequacy in the alternative forum were relatively infre-
quent. Most courts found that the absence of the availability of broad discovery rules,
contingent fee arrangements, and the right to a jury trial did not suffice to render the
alternative forum inadequate. See, e.g., Shields v. Mi Ryung Constr. Co., 508 F. Supp.
891, 895, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding an adequate forum in Saudi Arabia and stating
that "some inconvenience or the unavailability of beneficial litigation procedures similar
to those available in the federal district courts does not render an alternative forum
inadequate"); Grodinsky v. Fairchild Indus., 507 F. Supp. 1245, 1250-51 (D. Md.
1981) (Canada is adequate alternative forum, providing "fair and just compensation for
its citizens" despite absence of jury trials and punitive damages); Panama Processes,
S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 500 F. Supp. 787, 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (absence of adversarial
jury trial and pretrial discovery in Brazilian forum does not constitute such "a complete
denial of due process" as to preclude forum non conveniens dismissal), affd, 650 F.2d
408 (2d Cir. 1981); Shepard Niles Crane & Hoist Corp. v. Fiat, S.p.A., 84 F.R.D.
299, 306 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (absence of pretrial discovery, antitrust claims, punitive
damages, and declaratory judgments does not render Italian courts inadequate alterna-
tive forums; "[s]ome differences in procedures between American and foreign courts are
inevitable, and the plaintiff has not shown that any substantial rights are jeopardized").
But see Mobil Tankers Co., V. Mene Grande Oil Co., 363 F.2d 611, 614 (3d Cir.)
(inadequate discovery procedures and unacceptable limits on use of expert testimony in
the alternative forum bar dismissal), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 945 (1966); Fiorenza v.
United States Steel Int'l, 311 F. Supp. 117, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (among other
factors, absence of contingent fee arrangements in Bahamas renders alternative forum
inadequate when plaintiff is impecunious); Odita v. Elder Dempster Lines, 286 F.
Supp. 547, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (United Kingdom was an inadequate alternative fo-
rum for an impecunious plaintiff because of the unlawfulness of contingent fee agree-
ments and because the plaintiff might not be allowed to enter England because of his
inability to support himself); Bagarozy v. Menegheni, 8 Ill. App. 2d 285, 292-93, 131
N.E.2d 792, 796 (1955) (lack of adversarial proceedings in Italy renders that forum
inadequate).
... Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 793-94 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981); Burrington v. Ashland Oil Co., 134 Vt. 211, 216,
356 A.2d 506, 510 (1976). The use of the phrase "reverse forum shopping" is not an
entirely fai- characterization. Although a defendant moving to dismiss on forum non
conveniens grounds may be motivated by a desire to have foreign law apply to the
controversy, unless that motivation is combined with some presumption in favor of the
defendant's choice of forums, it does not have the same effect as forum shopping by
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unless "the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inad-
equate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all,"200 the trial court
may dismiss the case without feeling constrained by the anticipated
change in law. The Court thus authorized the use of the forum non
conveniens doctrine to reduce plaintiffs' forum shopping.2"'
While the limitation on plaintiffs' forum shopping resulting from
the Reyno decision represents a rational development in the law, the
employment of the forum non conveniens doctrine to achieve that end is
problematical. The Court's analysis fails to consider the fact that the
forum shopping in question is possible because of jurisdictional and
choice-of-law decisions that the Court believed were beyond federal
scrutiny. Under Erie, state choice-of-law and jurisdictional rules must
be applied in federal court unless they violate the Constitution.0 2 A
state's lack of interest in the controversy will not invalidate its assertion
of jurisdiction if minimum contacts with the defendant are estab-
lished;203 the district court in Reyno would not have been permitted to
plaintiffs. The "evil" of forum shopping is not that it is motivated by a desire to manip-
ulate the applicable law. Rather, it is that there is a disproportionate advantage be-
stowed on the plaintiff by both giving the plaintiff the choice of forums and assigning a
presumption in favor of that choice. As the Court in Reyno made clear, the fact that the
plaintiff is permitted to choose the forum does not mean that she should also have her
choice of the applicable law. See Reyno, 454 U.S. at 256-57 n.24. In contrast, when
defendants "reverse forum shop" through the forum non conveniens doctrine, the par-
ties are on an equal footing, and the court can assess the relative advantages of the
forums free from the strictures of any presumption. To condemn the forum non con-
veniens doctrine because it permits "reverse forum shopping" is to say that plaintiffs
should have an unfettered right to select the applicable law-a proposition that would
be difficult to defend.
200 Reyno, 454 U.S. at 254.
201 It is not clear why the court should refrain from dismissal even when the
plaintiff's claim would be absolutely barred in the alternative forum. If, according to
the law of the "appropriate" forum, the defendant wins because the plaintiff has no
cause of action, why should .the plaintiff be able to manipulate that outcome by suing in
a different forum? If forum non conveniens doctrine is a legitimate check on forum
shopping, why should it be abandoned in the most flagrant instance?
202 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Arrowsmith
v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 226-27 (2d Cir. 1963).
203 See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984), in which the
Court dismissed the contention that, since the plaintiff was not a New Hampshire resi-
dent, New Hampshire's connection with the controversy was too tenuous to support
jurisdiction. See id. at 1480-81. Justice Rehnquist stated,
[W]e have not to date required a plaintiff to have "minimum contacts"
with the forum State before permitting that State to assert personal juris-
diction over a nonresident defendant. On the contrary, we have upheld the
assertion of jurisdiction where such contacts were entirely lacking. ...
• ..[PIlaintiff's residence in the forum State is not a separate re-
quirement, and lack of residence will not defeat jurisdiction established on
the basis of defendant's contacts.
Id. at 1480-81.
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disregard Pennsylvania's interest analysis for choice-of-law purposes
simply because it believed that Scottish interests in the controversy were
paramount. Nonetheless, the very same result-application of Scottish
law in a Scottish court-was achieved in the guise of a forum non con-
veniens dismissal for the very same reason-paramount Scottish
interests.
Why the Court endorsed circumvention of jurisdictional and con-
flicts rules through use of forum non conveniens is unclear. It may have
considered the question of when federal resources should be expended
on a given case to be appropriately tested by a federal rather than a
state standard. It is also possible that the Court viewed the forum's
interest in applying its law to be distinct from its interest in adjudicat-
ing the controversy.204 It is even conceivable that the Court was at-
tempting to provide an escape from parochial state choice-of-law rules
without saying so. Given the Court's disposition of the other two anom-
alies of the doctrine, °5 further explanation from the Supreme Court
does not appear imminent.
The court of appeals' rare reversal 206 of a trial court's forum non
conveniens dismissal provided the Supreme Court with the opportunity
to review the abuse-of-discretion standard created in Gulf Oil. The
Court endorsed the abuse-of-discretion standard, thereby insulating fo-
rum non conveniens decisions from extensive appellate review. Despite
the fact that the court of appeals had determined that the trial court
committed errors of law and fact,207 the Supreme Court sustained the
204 The Court in the past has apparently assumed that a state can have an "inter-
est" in applying its law, without having a sufficient "interest" to retain jurisdiction. See
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977) ("[Wle have rejected the argument that if
a State's law can properly be applied to a dispute, its courts necessarily have jurisdic-
tion over the parties to that dispute."); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254
(1958)("[The State] . . .does not acquire that jurisdiction by being the 'center of grav-
ity' of the controversy, or the most convenient location for litigation. The issue is per-
sonal jurisdiction, not choice of law."). However, those decisions dealt with an issue
different from the one involved here and are not appropriate precedents for the Court's
action in Reyno. The state interests in those cases were being tested for constitutional
sufficiency. The Court found that simply because application of a state's substantive
law to a controversy would be constitutional does not mean that the state's assertion of
personal jurisdiction over the defendant is also constitutional. The Court has not held
that a state has different interests in applying its law than in asserting jurisdiction,
merely that those decisions may be subjected to different degrees of constitutional scru-
tiny under the fourteenth amendment. Here, the issue is not whether application of
Pennsylvania law or the assertion of jurisdiction by a Pennsylvania court would violate
the Constitution. Rather, the question is whether, assuming the constitutionality of both
the application of Pennsylvania law and the court's assertion of jurisdiction, the federal
courts may nonetheless circumvent the state's asserted interest by dismissing the case.
205 See supra text accompanying notes 188-89.
20 See infra notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
207 See Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 161, 163 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd,
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district court's action on the grounds that any mistakes made by the
trial court did not rise to the level of an abuse of discretion and that the
court of appeals' reversal therefore represented impermissible second-
guessing of the trial court's judgment:
The forum non conveniens determination is committed to the
sound discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only
when there has been a clear abuse of discretion; where the
court has considered all relevant public and private interest
factors, and where its balancing of these factors is reasona-
ble, its decision deserves substantial deference. . . In exam-
ining the District Court's analysis of the public and private
interests, however, the Court of Appeals seems to have lost
sight of this rule, and substituted its own judgment for that
of the District Court.
208
As in Gulf Oil, the need for deference to the trial court's ruling is
far from self-evident. As in that case, the forum non conveniens motion
in Reyno was based on a paper record, one that the Supreme Court
apparently found sufficient for purposes of review. The court of ap-
peals' finding that the trial court predicated its dismissal on an errone-
ous choice-of-law determination was not reversed by the Supreme
Court. In sustaining the forum non conveniens dismissal, rather than
remanding the case to allow the trial court to reconsider its determina-
tion in light of the proper choice-of-law standard, the Reyno Court nec-
essarily made an independent evaluation of the Gulf Oil factors on the
basis of the record.
The third Gulf Oil anomaly, deference to the plaintiff's choice of
forum, did come under scrutiny in Reyno. While the Court cut back on
the presumptive weight given foreign plaintiffs' choices of forum, it did
not address the underlying principle that a plaintiff's choice of forum
generally should be accorded great deference. The district court's deci-
sion not to give normal deference to the plaintiff's choice of forum was
endorsed by the Supreme Court on the grounds that, when a foreign
plaintiff sues outside of her home forum, the choice of forum is suspect.
In contrast, "when the home forum has been chosen, it is reasonable to
assume that this choice is convenient. ' 20 9 The Court emphasized that
"the deference accorded a plaintiff's choice of forum has never been
intended to guarantee that the plaintiff will be able to select the law
454 U.S. 235 (1981).
208 Reyno, 454 U.S. at 257.
209 Id. at 255-56.
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that will govern the case."' 10
The Court's analysis does not adequately explain the general rule
that a defendant seeking dismissal must establish "oppressiveness and
vexation . . . out of all proportion to plaintiff's convenience."211 The
imposition of such a heavy burden of proof operates not simply as a
rebuttable inference that a plaintiffs choice of forum is a "reasonable"
one-the rationale for the rule stated by the Court-but also implies
the existence of much more substantive reasons for placing a thumb on
the scales in a plaintiff's favor. If the normal presumption in favor of
the plaintiff's choice of forum is not intended to bestow an advantage in
selecting the most favorable law, it is hard to understand what its pur-
pose is. If indeed the concern is only that the choice of forum be a
reasonable one, examination of the record would provide a sufficient
basis for determination.
The explanation may lie in a desire to cut down on the number
and complexity of pretrial procedural motions," 2 but such a concern
has never been made explicit. Instead, the Court left trial courts with
the seeming contradiction that, although a plaintiff is not entitled to
forum shop, her choice of forum is normally entitled to enormous
deference.
The decision in Reyno is in one sense inconsequential. Only in
rare cases will a forum have sufficient contacts with the controversy to
apply its own law, yet. lack sufficient connection to withstand the forum
non conveniens motion.21 Moreover, the Erie problem of circum-
venting state jurisdictional and choice-of-law rules can be avoided if the
Court acknowledges that forum non conveniens reflects substantive
choices properly governed by state law. On another level, however, the
holding in Reyno expands the opportunities provided by the forum non
conveniens doctrine for the informal resolution of important, substan-
tive dilemmas about the allocation of governmental authority. The deci-
sion strongly reaffirms the wide discretion that trial courts have in dis-
posing of forum non conveniens motions, implicitly endorses the use of
210 Id. at 257 n.24.
211 Koster, 330 U.S. at 524.
212 This, in fact, was a basis for Currie's and Braucher's concerns about allowing
forum non conveniens dismissals in federal courts. See Braucher, supra note 4, at 930-
31; Currie, supra note 4, at 416.
21 Indeed, in the admiralty area, the inapplicability of U.S. law seems to be the
sine qua non of forum non conveniens; once U.S. admiralty law is deemed applicable,
dismissal is effectively foreclosed, since the courts apply the same test for forum non
conveniens as for choice of law. See, e.g., Szumlicz v. Norwegian Am. Line, Inc., 698
F.2d 1192, 1195 (11th Cir. 1983); Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos V, 628 F.2d 308, 315 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981). See generally, Note, The Convenient
Forum Abroad Revisited, supra note 5, at 770.
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the doctrine to correct anomalous choice-of-law rules, and encourages
employment of the doctrine by cutting back on the presumption in
favor of a plaintiff's choice of forum. The result will inevitably be an
increasing number of aibitrary and inconsistent decisions that are effec-
tively immune from appellate review.
III. THE FLAWED DOCTRINE IN ACTION
The Supreme Court's decisions in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert
14
and Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno2 15 described a doctrine of forum non
conveniens that entails a discretionary balancing of factors and
prescribes an extremely deferential standard of review. One would ex-
pect that the cases decided under such a doctrine would be unpredict-
able and inconsistent in outcome and virtually immune from appellate
review. A canvassing of lower court cases demonstrates these flaws.
The most striking pattern that emerges from the case law is the
dramatic increase in the use of forum non conveniens in the last twenty
years. The volume of reported federal forum non conveniens decisions
in the district courts has more than tripled in the last ten years, from a
total of twenty-five between the years 1965 and 1974 to 111 cases in
the past decade.2"6
The style of federal and state court forum non conveniens deci-
sions is also notable: they are typically one to two pages in length
217
and consist primarily of block quotations of the public and private fac-
tors listed in Gulf Oil. The "analysis" frequently is limited to a state-
ment that in applying these factors the court found the balance of pub-
lic and private interests to weigh in favor of retention or dismissal.21
Indeed, given the standard of review established by the Supreme Court,
a trial court wishing to avoid reversal on appeal is best off not tipping
214 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
215 454 U.S. 235 (1980).
216 These numbers are based on a Westlaw search in April 1985 using federal
courts key 45 (forum non conveniens). Although the numbers may be inaccurate to the
extent that there are inconsistencies in the classification of cases under the West key
system, they tend to indicate a significant trend toward more frequent invocation of
forum non conveniens.
217 See, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. Hellman, 75 Cal. App. 3d 554, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 390 (1977); Cowles v. Cowles, 263 A.2d 658 (D.C. 1970); Field Indus. v. Bran-
rose Realty, 470 A.2d 1266 (Me. 1984); Martin v. Educational Testing Servs., 179
N.J. Super. 317, 431 A.2d 868 (1981).
218 See, e.g., People ex rel. Campagnie Nationale v. Giliberto, 74 Ill. 2d 90, 383
N.E.2d 977 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979); Silversmith v. Kenosha Auto
Transp., 301 N.W.2d 725 (Iowa 1981); ; Eaton v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 96
Nev. 773, 616 P.2d 400 (1980); Litton Indus. Sys. v. Kennedy Van Corp., 117 N.J.
Super. 52, 283 A.2d 55 (1971).
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its hand. A court of appeals would be hard pressed to find that a trial
court "abused its discretion" when it has dutifully recited the Gulf Oil
factors and stated a conclusion.
Appellate review of forum non conveniens rulings is erratic. Be-
cause the federal courts of appeals use the abuse-of-discretion standard
adopted in Gulf Oil, reversals of forum non conveniens rulings are in-
frequent. There have been ninety-three reported forum non conveniens
decisions by federal courts of appeals since the Gulf Oil decision, only
twenty-seven of which were reversals.2 9 Only fifteen cases in which the
district court retained jurisdiction under forum non conveniens reached
the courts of appeals, 20 and, of these, all but two were affirmed.
These trends suggest that district courts faced with increasingly
common motions for dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens
have precious little guidance from the courts of appeals on how they
should balance the Gulf Oil factors. Moreover, such decisions by the
trial courts are subject to only cursory appellate scrutiny.
The New York courts' treatment of forum non conveniens appeals
provides an intriguing comparison. Although the New York Court of
Appeals purports to have adopted the same doctrinal approach used by
the federal courts,221 forum non conveniens rulings by New York trial
courts, including decisions to retain jurisdiction, are regularly reversed
on appeal.222 The New York appellate courts have apparently found
219 A Lexis search in February 1985 using the search command "conveniens" re-
vealed 338 cases in the federal courts of appeals since 1947. Only 93 of these, however,
were decisions specifically reviewing forum non conveniens rulings. Since this figure
does not include judgment order affirmances or other summary opinions not discussing
forum non conveniens, the ratio of reversals to reported appellate decisions is very
likely even lower. Use of the judgment order affirmance could well be an attractive
vehicle to dispose of these complicated, fact-dependent decisions reviewed under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. See, e.g., Abiaad v. C.T. Corp. Sys., 696 F.2d 980 (3d
Cir. 1982); Harrison v. Wyeth Laboratories, 676 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1982); Malka v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., 636 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir. 1980).
220 This is undoubtedly due to the fact that denials of forum non conveniens mo-
tions are insulated from appellate review by the final judgment rule. See 28 U.S.C. §
1291 (1982). Since denial of the motion simply results in retention of the case for trial,
there is no appealable ruling except where interlocutory appeal is permitted, or when
the case has been reduced to judgment against the defendant after trial on the merits, or
when summary judgment has been granted. Moreover, an appellate court would have a
difficult time concluding that the "balance of public and private" convenience would be
served by nullifying the lower court judgment and requiring relitigation in an alterna-
tive forum.
221 See, e.g., Silver v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 29 N.Y.2d 356, 360-61, 278 N.E.2d
619, 621-22, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398, 402 (1972) (citing Gulf Oil).
222 A May 1985 Westlaw search of New York cases, using the West key number
for discretion to decline jurisdiction, 106 key 28, and "conveniens" and Court (N.Y.)
but not Court (Sup. or Mun.), located 116 cases. 107 of these were appellate decisions
reviewing lower courts' forum non conveniens decisions. Of those 107 cases, there were
62 reversals, 42 affirmances, and 3 remands. 37 of the reversals were of lower court
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that forum non conveniens decisions can be subjected to meaningful ap-
pellate review and need not be vested wholly in the discretion of the
trial courts.223
Nonetheless, most courts continue to decide forum non conveniens
cases without the benefit of appellate courts' guidance and with little
idea which Gulf Oil factors should be weighed most heavily in the bal-
ancing of conveniences. Two classes of cases that are brought by foreign
plaintiffs demonstrate the inconsistencies of the forum non conveniens
doctrine in particularly striking fashion-aircraft-collision cases and
product-liability cases involving pharmaceuticals. The fact patterns ad-
denials of forum non conveniens motions. See, e.g., Blais v. Deyo, 97 A.D.2d 613, 468
N.Y.S.2d 91 (App. Div. 1983); Meritum Corp. v. Lawyers. Title Ins. Corp., 88 A.D.2d
828, 451 N.Y.S.2d 134 (App. Div. 1982); Adriana Dev. Corp. N.V. v. Gaspar, 81
A.D.2d 235, 439 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1981). Such denials would not even constitute appeala-
ble final orders in federal court. See supra note 220. Pursuant to New York appellate
procedure, the parties may appeal to the appellate division any trial court ruling that
"affects a substantial right." See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 5701(a)(2)(v) (McKinney
1978). Both grants and denials of forum non conveniens rulings are thereby easily
reviewable.
223 The relatively high proportion of reversals can be attributed in part to a lower
standard of review than is exercised by federal appellate courts. At least when reviewed
by the appellate division, the trial court's judgment does not seem to be accorded any
special deference; the appellate division may exercise its own discretion in disposing of
the motion. See Slaughter v. Waters, 41 A.D.2d 810, 810-11, 342 N.Y.S.2d 180, 182
(App. Div. 1973) ("[A]fter weighing all of the circumstances involved herein and bal-
ancing the conveniences and interests of the parties, we cannot conclude [contrary to the
trial court] that New York is a clearly inconvenient forum . . . ."); accord N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. LAW § 5501(c) (McKinney 1978) ("The appellate division shall review ques-
tions of law and questions of fact on an appeal . . . ."). Thereafter, however, the court
of appeals will use an abuse-of-discretion standard to review the appellate division's
ruling. See Mollendo Equip. Co. v. Sekisan Trading Co., 43 N.Y.2d 916, 374 N.E.2d
623, 403 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1978) (appellate division did not abuse its discretion in revers-
ing trial court's denial of forum non conveniens motion).
In contrast to the three United States Supreme Court decisions addressing forum
non conveniens in the last 38 years, the New York Court of Appeals has produced
numerous such opinions since 1968. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d
474, 467 N.E.2d 245, 478 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1984); Banco Ambrosiano, S.P.A. v. Artoc
Bank & Trust Ltd., 62 N.Y.2d 65, 464 N.E.2d 432, 476 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1984); Blais v.
Deyo, 60 N.Y.2d 679, 455 N.E.2d 662, 468 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1983) (memorandum opin-
ion); Belachew v. Michael, 59 N.Y.2d 1004, 453 N.E.2d 1243, 466 N.Y.S.2d 954
(1983); Westwood Assocs. v. Deluxe Gen., Inc., 53 N.Y.2d 618, 420 N.E.2d 966, 438
N.Y.S.2d 774 (1981) (memorandum opinion); Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. University of
Houston, 49 N.Y.2d 574, 404 N.E.2d 726, 427 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1980); Epstein v.
Sirivejkul, 48 N.Y.2d 738, 397 N.E.2d 1326, 422 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1979) (memorandum
opinion); Mollendo Equip. Co. v. Sekisan Trading Co., 43 N.Y.2d 916, 374 N.E.2d
623, 403 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1978) (memorandum opinion); Hadjioannou v. Avramides, 40
N.Y.2d 929, 358 N.E.2d 516, 389 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1976); Irrigation & Indus. Dev.
Corp. v. Indag, S.A., 37 N.Y.2d 522, 337 N.E.2d 749, 375 N.Y.S.2d 296 (1975); Mar-
tin v. Mieth, 35 N.Y.2d 414, 321 N.E.2d 777, 362 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1974); Silver v.
Great Am. Ins. Co., 29 N.Y.2d 356, 278 N.E.2d 619, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1972);
Varkonyi v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Airea Rio Grandense, 22 N.Y.2d 333, 239
N.E.2d 542, 292 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1968).
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dressed by the courts in these cases are identical in all relevant details,
yet the results are inconsistent.224
The typical airplane-accident case brought by foreign plaintiffs is
instituted against an American manufacturer either in the defendant's
state of incorporation or at its principal place of business. The aircraft
crashed abroad, but defective manufacture and design is alleged to have
occurred in the United States. The plaintiffs have come to the United
States to avail themselves of more liberal damage awards or strict-lia-
bility rules. In virtually every case, the parties assert that relevant evi-
dence and witnesses are to be found in both the domestic and foreign
forums, and each case presents the anomaly of foreign plaintiffs and
domestic defendants both asserting that it would be more "convenient"
for them to litigate thousands of miles from their own homes. Defen-
dants inevitably offer to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign forum,
transport all American evidence there, and waive any statute-of-limita-
tions defense,225 or agree to do the same as a condition of the court's
dismissing the case, thereby undercutting the plaintiffs' argument that
there is no adequate alternative forum, a prerequisite to dismissal
under Gulf Oil and Reyno.226 Defendants also assert that the witnesses
in the foreign forums are beyond the court's subpoena power, thereby
rendering the foreign forum preferable.
Courts confronted with aircraft-collision cases respond to the bal-
ance-of-conveniences argument differently, depending on whether they
perceive a forum interest in the litigation. 7 When a forum interest is
224 Nothing is wrong, of course, with different states having different attitudes
about which cases they wish their courts to hear, as long as unconstitutional classifica-
tions are not employed to allocate access to their courts. If in fact disparate treatment of
similar cases is attributable to legitimate policy differences among jurisdictions, that is
an inevitable result of a federal system. On the other hand, disparate results that simply
reflect variations in the subjective predilections of judges exercising discretion are less
acceptable, especially insofar as these results represent judges' tacit value judgments
about the respective strengths of the relevant governmental interests.
115 This offer or agreement by defendants has become a standard feature of most
forum non conveniens motions. See, e.g., Fiacco v. United Technologies Corp., 524 F.
Supp. 858, 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (defendant offered to concede liability and submit to
the jurisdiction of a Norwegian court if the domestic court would dismiss on forum non
conveniens grounds); Emerton v. Canal Barge Co., 70 Ill. App. 2d 49, 52, 216 N.E.2d
457, 458-59 (1966) (defendant offered, if forum non conveniens dismissal was granted,
to file a general appearance and not to contest the jurisdiction of federal or state courts
in Tennessee); Bewers v. American Home Prods. Corp., 99 A.D.2d 949, 949, 472
N.Y.S.2d 637, 638 (forum non conveniens dismissal granted on condition that defen-
dants waive objections to the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, accept service of pro-
cess there, and waive any statute-of-limitations defense), affd, 64 N.Y.2d 630, 474
N.E.2d 247, 485 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1984).
22 See Reyno, 454 U.S. at 254 & n.22; Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 506-07.
227 See generally supra note 224 (suggesting possible problems with the disparate
treatment of similar forum non conveniens motions).
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found to exist, usually on the basis of deterring tortious manufacturing
activity within the forum,228 the courts note that it is as easy to bring
proof from the foreign forum as it is to carry evidence to that loca-
tion,22 and that any difficulties in acquiring proof will disadvantage
the plaintiffs as much as or more than the defendants.230 When no sig-
nificant forum interest is found, the availability of foreign witnesses is
elevated in importance 231 (usually without any indication whether their
attendance could in fact be compelled in the foreign forum or whether
subpoena power would in fact be necessary were jurisdiction retained),
and a paramount interest in the litigation is ascribed to the foreign
forum, despite the fact that its laws are less favorable to the injured
plaintiffs.
232
Given the factual similarity between the cases, the inconsistency of
results is startling.2"3 In the scope of two weeks, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit dismissed a Norwegian helicopter-collision ase234
and retained the Scottish airline-accident litigation that was the subject
of the Supreme Court's review in Reyno,235 despite the fact that both
cases were brought against United States manufacturers by or on behalf
of foreign victims.
The residency of the parties seems to make an enormous difference
in aircraft-collision litigation. When even one or two plaintiffs are
American citizens-not even citizens of the forum-the courts are much
more likely to retain jurisdiction than when all plaintiffs are foreign
citizens.236 Although the Supreme Court in Reyno did, in some sense,
228 See, e.g., Kahn v. United Technologies Corp., 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,651,
17,653 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1981).
229 See, e.g., Grimandi v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 512 F. Supp. 764, 778-79 (D.
Kan. 1981).
230 See, e.g., Ciprari v. Sevicos Aereos Cruzeiro do Sul, 232 F. Supp. 433, 443
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
231 See, e.g., Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 787-90 (D.C. Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
222 See, e.g., Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490, 504, 507
(S.D.N.Y.), affd mem., 633 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1980); Orion Ins. Co. v. United Tech-
nologies Corp., 15 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,061, 18,061-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
223 See generally Fitzpatrick, Reyno: Its Progeny and Its Effects on Aviation Liti-
gation, 48 J. AIR L. & COM. 539, 548-57 (1983) (reviewing the varying outcomes of
six post-Reyno cases involving foreign air crashes). See generally Note, Forum Non
Conveniens and Foreign Plaintiffs: Addressing the Unanswered Questions of Reyno,
supra note 5, at 582 (judicial resistance to dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds
has led to less stringent application of Reyno principles).
23 Dahl v. United Technologies Corp., 632 F.2d 1027, 1033 (3d Cir. 1980).
23 Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 171 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 454
U.S. 235, 261 (1981).
238 Compare Fiacco v. United Technologies Corp., 524 F. Supp. 858, 859-60
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (action brought by one American citizen and eight foreign plaintiffs
retained) with Dahl v. United Technologies Corp., 632 F.2d 1027, 1028 (3d Cir. 1980)
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authorize a different standard for claims brought by nonresidents of the
forum, it did so on the basis of the reasonableness of the plaintiff's
choice of forum, not because of a lesser governmental interest in provid-
ing a remedy to foreign citizens.137 Once again, courts have invoked
convenience and reasonableness to mask a substantive choice about gov-
ernmental interests. Some commentators have challenged the propriety
of this discrimination against foreign citizens, particularly where the
United States has entered into treaty provisions granting equal court
access to foreign nationals.2"' Whether or not such discrimination is
thus illegal, or even improper,2 3 9 such distinctions do not seem appro-
(action brought by four Norwegian citizens dismissed). Some jurisdictions have, in fact,
acknowledged that they will not dismiss any claim brought by a domestic plaintiff. See,
e.g., Houston v. Caldwell, 359 So. 2d 858, 861 (Fla. 1978); cf. Bechtel Corp. v. Indus-
trial Indem. Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 45, 50, 150 Cal. Rptr. 29, 32 (1978) (claims brought
by domestic plaintiffs will rarely be dismissed).
New York, at one point, had adopted such a hard and fast rule, but abandoned it
in 1972 for a more flexible approach. See Silver v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 29 N.Y.2d 356,
362, 278 N.E.2d 619, 622, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398, 402 (1972) (applicability of forum non
conveniens doctrine depends on considerations of justice, fairness, and convenience).
Even thereafter, however, its courts continued to treat claims brought by residents dif-
ferently from claims asserted against residents. A graphic example is New York's treat-
ment of out-of-state automobile accidents. In Sullivan v. J.V. McNicholas Transfer
Co., 93 A.D.2d 527, 462 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1983), a resident plaintiff was permitted to
bring suit against an Ohio driver for an accident that occurred in Ohio and had virtu-
ally no other connection with New York. See id. at 532-34, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 937-39; Cf.
Boxer v. Paige, 66 A.D.2d 664, 664, 410 N.Y.S.2d 831, 831 (1978) (memorandum
opinion) (resident plaintiff permitted to bring suit on New Jersey auto accident);
Slaughter v. Waters, 41 A.D.2d 810, 810-11, 342 N.Y.S.2d 180, 182 (1973) (per
curiam) (resident plaintiff permitted to bring suit on North Carolina auto accident).
The Sullivan court noted that the defendant had not met its burden of establishing that
New York was an inconvenient forum and that trial in Ohio would better serve the
interests of justice or convenience of the parties. See 93 A.D.2d at 532, 462 N.Y.S.2d at
938. In the same year, another appellate division court dismissed a factually similar
case brought by a Canadian plaintiff against a New York defendant on the basis of an
accident in Canada. Here, the court stated the rule that plaintiffs bringing suit on
transitory torts arising outside the state must demonstrate "special circumstances" to
warrant retention of jurisdiction. See Blais v. Deyo, 92 A.D.2d 998, 999, 461 N.Y.S.2d
471, 472 (memorandum opinion), affd, 60 N.Y.2d 679, 4'55 N.E.2d 662, 468
N.Y.S.2d 103 (1983) (memorandum opinion).
:37 See Reyno, 454 U.S. at 255-56.
238 See Wilson, Access-to-Courts Provisions in United States Commercial Trea-
ties, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 20, 47 (1953); Note, Forum Non Conveniens and Foreign
Plaintiffs: Addressing the Unanswered Questions of Reyno, supra note 5, at 604; Re-
cent Developments, Federal Courts: Forum Non Conveniens, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J.
404, 410-11 (1979).
2"' States' preferences for their own citizens may well be legitimate. Indeed, the
central assumption behind interest analysis in a choice-of-law setting is that states have
a legitimate interest only in protecting persons within their borders; to the extent that
application of a state's law to a case would not advance that interest, the state is
deemed "disinterested" and will defer to the application of another state's law. See
generally A. EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 131-33 (1962); E.
STIMSON, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 348-52 (1963). For an interesting attack on the consti-
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priately made under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, which pur-
ports to focus upon the convenience of the forum and which is so flexi-
ble that appellate courts cannot effectively monitor its application.
Similarly erratic results were produced in the "British Pill Litiga-
tion." '24 A California attorney representing a group of British women
claiming injury due to ingestion of oral contraceptives brought several
hundred actions throughout the United States, in both federal and state
courts, against American manufacturers. The manufacturers succeeded
in establishing that all but one of the forums selected were inappropri-
ate under the forum non conveniens doctrine. Only California ulti-
mately determined that it should hear the cases; federal and state ac-
tions in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Illinois, and Ohio were
dismissed.2 1
As in the aircraft-collision litigation, convenience was not really
tutional validity of this preference, see Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in
Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 173 (1981).
For the most part, this preference has not been directly reflected in formal juris-
dictional doctrine. The Supreme Court has emphasized that it is the relationship be-
tween the defendant and the forum that is to be scrutinized in due process analysis. See,
e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1480-81 (1984); Rush v.
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980). However, the courts have assumed that contacts
"related" to the cause of action have more jurisdictional significance than unrelated
contacts. See, e.g., Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1480; Calder v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 1486
(1984); cf. von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analy-
sis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121 (1966) (isolated contacts may justify the assertion of spe-
cific jurisdiction to adjudicate claims arising out of those contacts). Although the Court
in these cases has disclaimed the requirement that the plaintiff have certain contacts
with the forum, it seems that the significance of the distinction between related and
unrelated contacts is ultimately based on a recognition of a state's legitimate interest in
protecting its own residents. To the extent that a contact is deemed related to the cause
of action, the state is deemed to have a constitutionally legitimate interest in its adjudi-
cation because some wrong has occurred within the state's borders that threatened the
safety or well-being of the state's residents.
240 In the interest of fairness, it should be noted that the author represented
American Home Products Corporation in a number of the British actions in Pennsylva-
nia and New York.
241 See, e.g., Purser v. American Home Prods. Corp., No. 80 Civ. 710 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 30, 1981); Harrison v. Wyeth Laboratories, 510 F. Supp. 1, 2-3 (E.D. Pa. 1980),
affd mem., 676 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1982); Jones v. Searle Laboratories, 93 Ill. 2d 366,
378, 444 N.E.2d 157, 163 (1982); In re British Oral Contraceptives Cases, No. L-
44473-78 (Morris County Sup. Ct. July 20, 1981), affd, No. A-348-81T3 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 23, 1982), cert. denied, 93 N.J. 320, 460 A.2d 710 (1983).
Similar results were obtained by American drug manufacturers who were sued by for-
eign plaintiffs claiming injuries sustained as a result of taking Bendectin. Compare In
re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1130, 1136-37 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (dismissing
suit brought by British plaintiffs), affd sub nom. Dowling v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
727 F.2d 608, 616 (6th Cir. 1984) and McCracken v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 34,463
(Ind. Cir. Ct. June 5, 1984) (dismissing suit brought by British plaintiffs) with Lake v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 262, 264 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (retaining jurisdic-
tion over suit brought by Canadian plaintiffs), motion for dismissal denied sub nom.
Haddad v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1158, 1159 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
19851
838 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the dispositive issue in the pharmaceuticals cases. Both parties pointed
to evidence located in the forum they preferred.242 Plaintiffs asserted
that corporate decisions were made in the United States to distribute
inadequately labeled and tested drugs in the United Kingdom and that
proof of that conduct was to be found in the United States.243 Defen-
dants countered that all evidence concerning causation and damages, as
well as proof that the drugs were distributed in accordance with the
informed approval of the British government, 44 was to be found in the
United Kingdom. While the various courts that addressed the forum
non conveniens issue differed as to how the balance of conveniences
should be resolved, the decisive fact both with the courts that declined
jurisdiction and with those that retained the cases was the perceived
importance of the forums' interests in regulating the conduct of Ameri-
can defendants abroad -and extending the protection of United States
law to foreign plaintiffs.
The attitude of the courts that dismissed the actions was typified
by that of Judge Weiner of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, who
concluded in Harrison v. Wyeth Laboratories245 that
Pennsylvania's interest in the regulation of the conduct of
drug manufacturers and the safety of drugs produced and
distributed within its borders does not extend so far as to
include such regulation of conduct on drugs produced or dis-
tributed in foreign countries. Questions as to the safety of
drugs marketed in a foreign country are properly the concern
242 See Purser v. American Home Prods. Corp., No. 80 Civ. 710, slip op. at 5-6
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 1981); Harrison v. Wyeth Laboratories, 510 F. Supp. 1, 2-3 (E.D.
Pa. 1980), affd mem., 676 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1982); Jones v. Searle Laboratories, 100
Ill. App. 3d 165, 166-67, 426 N.E.2d 917, 919 (1981), rev'd, 93 Ill. 2d 366, 444
N.E.2d 157 (1982); In re British Oral Contraceptives Cases, No. A-348-81T3, slip op.
at 10-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 23, 1982), cert. denied, 93 N.J. 320, 460
A.2d 710 (1983); Bewers v. American Home Prods. Corp., 99 A.D.2d 949, 950, 472
N.Y.S.2d 637, 638-39, affld, 64 N.Y.2d 630, 474 N.E.2d 247, 485 N.Y.S.2d 39
(1984).
24 See Purser v. American Home Prods. Corp., No. 80 Civ. 710, slip op. at 6-7
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 1981); Harrison v. Wyeth Laboratories, 510 F. Supp. 1, 3 (E.D.
Pa. 1980), affd mem., 676 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1982); Jones v. Searle Laboratories, 100
Ill. App. 3d 165, 167, 426 N.E.2d 917, 919 (1981), rev'd, 93 Ill. 2d 366, 444 N.E.2d
157 (1982); Bewers v. American Home Prods. Corp., 99 A.D.2d 949, 950, 472
N.Y.S.2d 637, 639, affd, 64 N.Y.2d 630, 474 N.E.2d 247, 485 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1984).
244 See Purser v. American Home Prods. Corp., No. 80 Civ. 710, slip op. at 5-6
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 1981); Harrison v. Wyeth Laboratories, 510 F. Supp. 1, 3 (E.D.
Pa. 1980), affd mem., 676 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1982); Jones v. Searle Laboratories, 100
Ill. App. 3d 165, 166-67, 426 N.E.2d 917, 919 (1981), rev'd, 93 Ill. 2d 366, 444
N.E.2d 157 (1982); Bewers v. American Home Prods. Corp., 99 A.D.2d 949, 950, 472
N.Y.S.2d 637, 638, affd, 64 N.Y.2d 630, 474 N.E.2d 247, 485 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1984).
245 510 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1980), affd mem., 676 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1982).
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of that country; the courts of the United States are ill-
equipped to set a standard of product safety for drugs sold in
other countries. . . . Each government must weigh the mer-
its of permitting the drug's use and the necessity of requiring
a warning. Each makes its own determination as to the stan-
dards of degree of safety and duty of care. This balancing of
the overall benefits to be derived from a product's use with
the risk of harm associated with that use is peculiarly suited
to a forum of the country in which the product is to be used.
Each country has its own legitimate concerns and its own
unique needs which must be factored into its process of
weighing the drug's merits, and which will tip the balance
for it one way or the other. The United States should not
impose its own view of the safety, warning, and duty of care
required of drugs sold in the United States upon a foreign
country when those same drugs are sold in that country.246
In contrast, the California Court of Appeals, in finding an abuse
of discretion in the trial court's dismissal, held in Holmes v. Syntex
Laboratories247 that trial in the United Kingdom was not a suitable
alternative primarily because of the absence of strict liability there.
Without even determining that California law would definitely apply if
the action were retained, the California court found that this "defi-
ciency" in the British substantive law of products liability demonstrated
that the "British courts [were] not a suitable alternative.""24 The court
also rejected the suggestion of Reyno that a foreign plaintiff's choice of
forum is entitled to less deference than a domestic plaintiff's choice,
declaring that, under California's law of forum non conveniens, "'since
it is for the plaintiff to choose the place of suit, his choice of a forum
should not be disturbed except for weighty reasons.' "249
248 Harrison, 510 F. Supp. at 4.
247 156 Cal. App. 3d 372, 202 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1984).
248 Id. at 383, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 780. The court relied heavily on British criticism
of British products-liability law in denying that its preference for California law indi-
cated provincialism:
Justice Cardozo once observed, "We are not so provincial as to say
that every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it other-
wise at home." . . . But if the present litigation occurs in Britain, appel-
lants will not simply lose their cause of action for strict liability, they will
be forced to litigate under a system of negligence law that the British
themselves have condemned as inadequate in the field of defective
products.
Id. at 387, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 782 (quoting Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99,
111, 120 N.E. 198, 201 (1918)).
249 Id. at 379, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 776-77 (quoting CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE §
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Although the Holmes court did not examine the policy choices un-
derlying its holding, its grant of substantial deference to the plaintiff's
choice of forum and its preclusion of dismissal when foreign law would
disadvantage the plaintiff reflect a fundamental substantive disagree-
ment with the other British Pill decisions. Implicit in Judge Weiner's
decision in Harrison was a judgment that the legitimate regulatory in-
terests of the forum state do not extend to governing the conduct of its
citizens outside of the jurisdiction. The Holmes decision, in contrast,
represents a willingness to export California law. Far from condemning
forum shopping, California has invited foreign plaintiffs into its courts
to avail themselves of less stringent requirements for demonstrating lia-
bility.2 50 If the law of the plaintiff's home forum is disadvantageous to
the plaintiff, as it inevitably will be any time the plaintiff has engaged
in forum shopping, dismissal from a California court will be virtually
foreclosed.251 Although in theory the court might still apply foreign law
after jurisdiction was retained, such a choice of law would be an odd
counterpoint to the court's retention of jurisdiction based on the inade-
quacy of foreign law.
The British Pill litigation in general and the Holmes decision in
particular present a number of troublesome issues. The Pill cases as a
whole demonstrate the underlying premise of this Article: the decision
whether or not to retain jurisdiction can frequently turn on a particular
court's judgment about the appropriate scope of the forum's regulatory
interest in the conduct in question and its relationship to other sover-
eigns' stakes in the controversy. The court may or may not make that
judgment explicit, and discussion of such concerns is even less likely to
appear in the cursory appellate review that the decision will receive if
the forum non conveniens motion is granted. 5 If the trial court denies
the motion, its view of the weight of respective governmental interests
usually will not be reviewed at all. Arbitrary and inconsistent decisions
are the inevitable result.25 3
410.30 judicial council comment (West 1973)).
280 The Holmes decision, indeed, comes very near to sanctioning "defendant shop-
ping" as well as forum shopping. The court noted that the British manufacturing sub-
sidiary of the American parent corporation was probably a more appropriate defendant
but asserted that there is no doctrine of "defendant non conveniens" in California. Id.
at 388, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 783. Suit against the California defendant, in California's
courts and under the liberal products-liability law available there, was thus allowed.
21 " '[The difference in applicable substantive law virtually dictates trial in
California.'" Id. at 382, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 779 (quoting International Harvester Co. v.
Superior Court, 95 Cal. App. 3d 652, 660, 157 Cal. Rptr. 324, 328 (1979)) (emphasis
added by the Holmes court).
52 See, e.g., Harrison v. Wyeth Laboratories, 676 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1982)
(mem.), affg 510 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
25 There is also a related process concern. In Holmes, the plaintiff was able to
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IV. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY OF JUDICIAL
AUTHORITY
If recent history is any indication, the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens will increasingly be relied upon to determine the right to court
access. 2" This is a troubling development. It represents a disintegration
of the rule of law and its replacement with informal and tacit
decisionmaking.
The emergence of forum non conveniens doctrine was facilitated
by a set of formal court-access principles that unduly compartmental-
ized and irrationally classified the various considerations determining
when and why courts have authority to hear cases. The limitations on
judicial authority reflected in the forum non conveniens doctrine are not
significantly different from the kinds of limitations reflected in rules
governing subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and venue.
Yet resolution of forum non conveniens motions is relegated to an infor-
mal and inconsistent process. Because we conceive of the decision
whether to reject the jurisdiction that the court formally possesses as
purely discretionary, and the product of some intangible balance of in-
numerable factors, the substantive implications of the doctrine are
obscured.
avoid dismissal by alleging that tortious decisions were made in California. These alle-
gations were accepted as true for the purpose of the forum non conveniens motion. See
Holmes, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 388, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 783. Although the defendant might
have contested those factual allegations, it would thereby have been forced to litigate at
least that issue in the very forum from which it sought dismissal. If, after discovery, the
defendant had succeeded in establishing that all of the decisions on the marketing of the
pharmaceuticals had been made in the United Kingdom, or even that some of them
had, it is unclear whether a forum non conveniens dismissal would still be available.
A similar, though distinguishable, situation arose in Insurance Corp. v. Compa-
gnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694 (1982). The defendant argued that the district court
could not compel it to engage in discovery procedures to ascertain whether sufficient
minimum contacts existed between the defendant and the forum to support the court's
assertion of personal jurisdiction. See id. at 695-96. Absent a determination at the out-
set that personal jurisdiction existed, the defendant continued, it could not be made to
participate in proceedings in that forum. See id. at 701, 706. The Supreme Court re-
jected this argument, holding that when a party fails to comply with a discovery order
under these circumstances the district court may sanction the party by proceeding as if
personal jurisdiction has been established. See id. at 708-09. In effect, therefore, the
defendant, by challenging jurisdiction, was forced to submit to it. However, this situa-
tion differs from that of a defendant pressing a motion to dismiss on forum non con-
veniens grounds because a defendant who denies the existence of personal jurisdiction
can default, and thereby preserve her objection, which can be raised as a defense in
subsequent attempts by the plaintiff to enforce the judgment. See id. at 706. Because
forum non conveniens objections are not a valid basis for collateral attack on a judg-
ment, a defendant objecting to an inconvenient forum has no option other than to urge
dismissal in the first action. See supra note 18.
254 See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
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The solution is not necessarily the elimination of the forum non
conveniens doctrine. Many of the limitations on judicial authority re-
flected in the cases represent sound reasons for declining the exercise of
jurisdiction. It is appropriate, for instance, to insure that the court with
the paramount interest in a controversy adjudicates the case. This pref-
erence reflects a belief that has in the past been embodied in jurisdic-
tional decisions; an inappropriate assertion of jurisdiction not only un-
duly burdens the forum state's courts but also infringes on the
regulatory prerogatives of the more appropriate forum.255 Such in-
fringement in a given case might be tempered by the application of the
other forum's laws, but this will not always cure the problem. For in-
stance, in the British Pill cases,2 56 the application of British negligence
doctrine by American courts would still have required American judges
to weigh the benefits and burdens of more extensive labeling of phar-
maceutical products in the United Kingdom. The question is not simply
what law to apply, but also who ought properly to apply it.
The limitations derived from private-convenience components of
the doctrine also seem to be sensible elements of court-access doctrine,
although they are less important than the forum non conveniens cases
seem to indicate. It may be appropriate, in the extreme case, to select
the venue based on the accessibility of evidence. However, as discussed
above,257 reliance on this factor in forum non conveniens decisions
seems as often as not to be a makeweight. In most cases involving inter-
state transactions there will be some evidence that is relatively difficult
to obtain no matter which forum is selected. In an age of modern tech-
nology and transportation, such inconveniences should be of less con-
cern than they once may have been. Particularly when each party is
151 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980) (states' status as "coequal sovereigns in a federal system" limits their power to
assert jurisdiction); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877). A number of commen-
tators have read the decision in Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S.
694 (1982), as a judicial retreat from viewing limits on personal jurisdiction as a means
of protecting federalist values implicated by the allocation of sovereign authority. See,
e.g., Drobak, supra note 33, at 1046-50. The Supreme Court held in Compagnie des
Bauxites that due process scrutiny of assertions of personal jurisdiction were "ulti-
mately a function of the individual liberty interest." Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S.
at 703 n.10. Whether or not the Compagnie des Bauxites decision represents a retreat
from viewing due process limitations on personal jurisdiction as required by notions of
federalism, the question of what limitations on personal jurisdiction are required by the
Constitution is different from the question whether allocating authority between sover-
eigns is an appropriate function of jurisdictional rules. Thus, even if it would be inap-
propriate to limit the scope of state sovereignty based on the due process clause, such
limitations might still be appropriate as a matter of state self-restraint, as a limit on the
reach of each state's jurisdiction, or as a matter of federal statute or common law.
258 See supra notes 240-53 and accompanying text.
257 See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
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attempting to litigate away from its home forum, the focus on conve-
nience is disingenuous. If the problems are forum shopping and how to
allocate decisionmaking authority among courts, those problems should
be addressed directly and explicitly.
If courts should indeed refuse to entertain suits for the reasons
reflected in the forum non conveniens cases, those choices can be appro-
priately recognized in formal jurisdictional doctrine. For instance, if we
do not want a court to hear a case involving an out-of-state tort brought
by an out-of-state plaintiff against a domestic defendant because the
forum appears to have no legitimate regulatory stake in the controversy,
then we should say that the court does not have jurisdiction to resolve
the dispute or that the court does not have jurisdiction if the alternative
forum does. 2 "8 Such a statement may be jarring, given the formal con-
ception of jurisdiction as an expression of power over the defendant. In
fact, personal jurisdiction has come to mean power over the defendant
for the purpose of a particular lawsuit, a meaning divorced from mere
physical power over the defendant or her property.259 However, if there
is utility in preserving the formal conception of personal jurisdiction,
the rules can be labeled limitations on subject-matter jurisdiction. The
particular labels do not matter as long as the rules developed are em-
bodied in formal doctrine, and are assertable in a lawsuit and subject to
appellate scrutiny to the same extent as other court-access doctrines.
258 A particularly difficult choice must be made in the situation where the forum
has been selected because the action would be time-barred in any alternative forum.
See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (1984) (fact that
statute of limitations has run in every other state does not affect issue of court's juris-
diction). I have suggested, supra note 201, that it was inconsistent for the Supreme
Court in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), to preclude dismissal of
causes of action for which no remedy would be provided in the alternative forum. If
forum shopping is unacceptable when it gives a slight advantage to the plaintiff, surely
it is even less acceptable when it is completely outcome-determinative. It may neverthe-
less be appropriate to draw a distinction between procedural and substantive law in
cases in which there is no remedy in the alternative forum. When the absence of a
remedy in the alternative forum is due to its statute of limitations or the court's inabil-
ity to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant, I would not preclude dismissal
but would instead condition it on the defendant's waiver of these procedural objections
to the alternative forum if the defenses are not available in the plaintiff's chosen forum.
I would not require a similar waiver with respect to the defendant's substantive de-
fenses under the law applied by the alternative forum.
I suggest this approach with some trepidation, knowing full well that the sub-
stance/procedure distinction in other areas has proved elusive. Moreover, such a rule
would violate the principle that choice of an inappropriate forum should not confer
upon the plaintiff the ability to manipulate the applicable law. However, a waiver of
procedural defenses seems to interfere only minimally with the alternative forum's reg-
ulatory prerogatives and seems to be a fair accommodation of the forum state's interest
in providing a forum, as reflected in its decision to apply a more liberal statute of
limitations to the case.
259 See Clermont, supra note 40, at 444-46.
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Determining the number and specific content of such rules must
await judicial or legislative development and doctrinal refinement. The
resulting doctrine will be nothing less than the sum of the choices cur-
rently made explicitly or implicitly in forum non conveniens rulings
about the appropriate allocation of decisionmaking authority among
different jurisdictions. Such decisions have no place in a doctrine vested
largely in the unfettered discretion of trial judges. There may still be an
appropriate place for discretionary dismissals based on the location of
evidence, but once jurisdictional rules address more explicitly how to
allocate authority among jurisdictions, discretionary dismissals based on
private convenience should be far less frequent.
A logical corollary to this reformulation of jurisdiction is the elimi-
nation of the deference accorded a plaintiff's choice of forum. That def-
erence seems part and parcel of an archaic power theory of personal
jurisdiction: if the defendant can be found there, she is subject to the
jurisdiction of the court, and therefore the plaintiff may sue wherever
the defendant can be found. One would have thought that such a rule
was discredited with the rejection of quasi in rem jurisdiction in Shaf-
fer v. Heitner;60 the presence of the defendant's person in the jurisdic-
tion is only a slightly greater justification for hearing the lawsuit than
the presence of the defendant's property. While a resident defendant is
not likely to be surprised by her amenability to suit in the forum, there
may be other reasons why a court's assertion of jurisdiction would be
inappropriate, as demonstrated by the forum non conveniens cases. At
the time of Shaffer, commentators suggested that transient service on a
defendant merely passing through the jurisdiction was undermined by
the Court's decision. 2 1 The logical extension of that insight is that even
a more permanent physical connection between the defendant and the
forum will not necessarily vest the court with jurisdiction over all con-
troversies involving that defendant. Accordingly, once formal jurisdic-
tion is reformulated to take account of the choice currently made in the
context of forum non conveniens decisions, it will be incumbent on the
plaintiff to establish not merely that proper service of process was ac-
complished, but also that trial in the chosen forum is appropriate for
more persuasive reasons.
Although such a reformulation would represent a fairly radical de-
parture from American conceptions of jurisdiction,26 2 it is-in fact quite
260 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
21 See Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of
In Personam Jurisdiction? 25 VILL. L. REv. 38, 60-68 (1979); Silberman, supra note
46, at 75.
282 But cf. Clermont, supra note 40, at 449-50 (venue rules based on convenience
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similar to the current state of personal jurisdiction in the United King-
dom. Pursuant to the British long-arm statute,263 a plaintiff wishing to
invoke the jurisdiction of British courts over a foreign defendant must
establish the propriety of the British forum, taking into consideration
most of the factors identified in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.264 Such a
showing is a prerequisite to the existence of jurisdiction under the Brit-
ish doctrine of forum conveniens,265 which requires that the invocation
of jurisdiction in British courts be justified by some reason for hearing
the case in a British, as opposed to some other, forum. Accordingly, a
plaintiff's choice of forum is accorded no special deference, and resolu-
tion of the issue is not considered a matter of trial-court discretion.26
The proposal here would simply impose such a burden on a plaintiff
even when there has been service within the jurisdiction.2 67 Such a rule
would take the decision out of the unfettered discretion of the trial
judge and would bring about greater uniformity and coherence in the
decisions.266 In short, a transformation of the doctrine of forum non
should replace jurisdiction as the primary determinant of place of trial on an interstate
level); Ehrenzweig, supra note 49, at 312 (service of process should not be sufficient to
create jurisdiction; the doctrine of forum conveniens should replace personal jurisdic-
tion); Redish, supra note 91, at 1137-41 (due process limitations on personal jurisdic-
tion should focus on the convenience and burdens of litigating in a particular forum).
The primary distinction between these writers and me is their general abandonment of
sovereignty as a relevant component of forum-access rules; they propose instead that
convenience be the central focus. See, e.g., Clermont, supra note 40, at 443 (the "goal
of a coherent national court system" should be the "convenient administration of jus-
tice"); Redish, supra note 91, at 1114-15. I share their premise that the current catego-
ries for court access are redundant, and should be collapsed into a unified approach,
but am not prepared to discount the importance of limits on sovereignty. As demon-
strated by the forum non conveniens decisions, perceived limits on -sovereign interests
and authority are an important component of court-access doctrine on both an interna-
tional and interstate level. The consequent judgments about how to allocate sovereign
power ought to be made explicit.
263 See R.S.C. 1965, Order 11 ("Service of Process, Etc., Out of the Jurisdic-
tion"), reprinted in 1 THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 1982 91 (1. Jacob ed. 1981).
264 330 U.S. 501 (1947); see Inglis, Forum Conveniens-Basis ofJurisdiction in
the Commonwealth, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 583, 584-87 (1964).
265 See Inglis, supra note 264, at 586-87.
266 See Inglis, supra note 264, at 584 (citing Oppenheimer v. Louis Rosenthal &
Co., [1937] 1 All E.R. 23, 26).
26 Inglis asserts that British law imposes an "onus of adducing evidence" both on
defendants urging the court to refuse jurisdiction and on plaintiffs urging the court to
assert jurisdiction. See id. at 591.
268 Two potential objections to such a proposal should be addressed. The first is a
concern as old as the forum non conveniens doctrine itself: there is a high process cost
in providing parties with complex pretrial defenses not related to the merits. As was
well illustrated in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), the raising of such
defenses can significantly delay trial of the case on the merits and can be used by
defendants with greater resources to wear down plaintiffs. See, e.g., Currie, The Fed-
eral Courts and the American Law Institute-Part II, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 307
(1969) ("[D]eciding where [the most convenient] forum is costs altogether too much
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conveniens into a doctrine of forum conveniens would cure many of the
defects in the current doctrine and would represent a rational develop-
ment of the law.
time and money."). This is certainly a legitimate concern. However, the problem would
not seem to be worsened by formalizing forum non conveniens and merging it into
jurisdictional rules. Defendants currently have the same range of possible pretrial mo-
tions as would be available to them under a more structured forum conveniens doctrine.
In general, it would seem that if there were more appellate guidance and more formal
rules to guide the trial court, resolution of the issue could be expedited and the law
made more predictable. See Friendly, supra note 4, at 783-84.
The second objection is more troublesome but again is probably not peculiar to my
proposal. It could be argued that providing full appellate review of jurisdictional deci-
sions made after an inquiry into the factors now weighed under forum non conveniens
would not produce greater consistency or rationality in the law of jurisdiction. Indeed,
the law of personal jurisdiction is replete with appellate decisions, and one could hardly
claim that there is consistency or predictability in that area. Ultimately, it appears that
the minimum-contacts test boils down to the individual trial court's assessment of "fun-
damental fairness." Thus, the argument concludes, by "jurisdictionalizing" the forum
non conveniens considerations we are simply moving the problem back to a different
shell in the shell game. See Clermont, supra note 40, at 454 (jurisdictional "rules" have
not reduced uncertainty; "[p]erhaps we should learn to accept [it]").
The implications of such an attack go far beyond the issue of court access to the
nature of the judicial process in general and the question whether rules and doctrine
can ever determine the appropriate outcome in individual cases. The minimum-contacts
test does, however, seem to be a particularly egregious case of doctrinal indeterminacy.
One explanation is that personal-jurisdiction doctrine is simply poor doctrine, devel-
oped without reference to the underlying policies purportedly addressed by the doctrine.
Courts accordingly do not know how or why to count contacts. See Brilmayer, supra
note 33, at 112-13. Inconsistency is thus inevitable. Earlier, I suggested that such im-
precision is a result, at least in part, of the availability of a catch-all forum non con-
veniens doctrine. The elimination of the forum non conveniens option would put some
pressure on the courts to develop more coherent jurisdictional doctrine. Moreover, im-
plicit in my proposal is a systematic overhauling of court-access doctrine and the devel-
opment of a set of rules that attempt to articulate which cases a forum cares about
enough to retain and why.
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